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This paper examines the benefits and costs of disclosing regulatory oversight actions. 
Specifically, I analyze the capital-market consequences of the SEC’s decision to make firm 
reviews publicly available. Typically, following a review of a public company, the SEC 
creates a “comment letter” describing its concerns about the company’s financials. Comment 
letters were previously available only to the company itself, but the SEC started publishing 
them in 2005. Using a unique database of comment letters issued before 2005, my research 
design exploits the staggered disclosure of comment letters to show that the letters affect 
information asymmetry differently in the pre- and post-periods. While the comment letters 
exacerbate information asymmetry around earnings releases when they are private, they 
decrease it when public. This effect is stronger when the reviews are more timely. I also show 
that comment letters increase the information content of the associated earnings releases only 
when they are public. The effect is stronger for companies with higher levels of investor 
monitoring. However, I provide evidence that the SEC’s disclosure decision has enhanced 
managers’ ability to anticipate the content of the reviews, partially mitigating oversight 
efficacy. Despite this cost, my results suggest that the disclosure of SEC’s reviews helps to 
level the playing field among investors and improves the complementary oversight role 
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Prior literature has emphasized the importance of enforcement for effective 
regulation.
1
 Without complete enforcement, regulators must identify the best 
enforcement strategies (e.g., Becker 1968; Stigler 1970; Jennings, Kedia, and Rajgopal 
2011). However, there is little evidence about which elements of enforcement matter in 
determining outcomes (e.g., Coffee 2007; Holthausen 2009; Barth and Israeli 2013). 
This paper studies the benefits and costs of disclosing Securities Exchange 
Commission’s (SEC) firm reviews and contributes to the literature by examining the 
capital market effects of the decision of the SEC to disclose these reviews.  
The first potential benefit analyzed is the possibility that the dissemination levels 
the playing field among investors. The second stems from the potentially 
complementary oversight role played by investors. Yet at the same time, there may be 
costs associated with making the reviews public. Disclosure may increase managers’ 
ability to predict the content of the reviews, which may reduce the efficacy of the SEC’s 
oversight.  
To examine this question, I use a recent regulatory change. As required by 
federal law, the Division of Corporation Finance within the SEC must review the filings 
of each reporting company at least once every three years. Typically, following a review 
of a public company, the SEC creates a “comment letter” describing any concerns about 
the company’s financials. While the SEC did not make these comment letters public 
until May 12, 2005, I access a unique proprietary database of comment letters issued 
before this date to examine the capital-market effects caused by the policy change.  
                                                          
1 For example, Ball et al. (2000; 2003), Bushman and Piotroski (2006), Burgstahler et al. (2006), Daske, Hail, Leuz, 





 From an enforcement standpoint, the SEC’s policy change may have trade-offs. 
A potential benefit of public dissemination is the SEC’s stated reason: “to expand the 
transparency of the comment process so that this information is available to a broader 
audience, free of charge.”
2
 However, this benefit is theoretically ambiguous. Some 
theoretical analyses assume that public information substitutes for the private 
information held by investors and reduces information asymmetry (e.g., Diamond and 
Verrecchia 1991). (See Bamber et al. (2012) for a theoretical review.) But other 
analyses suggest that public information complements investors’ private information 
and increases information asymmetry (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Bushman et al. 
1996; Fischer and Verrecchia 1999; Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). 
Another potential benefit of the SEC’s decision to make firm reviews public stems from 
the potentially complementary enforcement role played by investors. Disclosure may 
allow investors to identify accounting concerns and prompt them to pressure directors, 
officers, and other market participants to improve the information content of earnings 
(e.g., Bushee 1998; Fischer and Verrecchia 2000; Chen et al. 2007; Ferri and Sandino 
2009; Cox et al. 2010).  
However, there are also potential costs associated with the change. First, 
companies may be able to infer the SEC’s main concerns and constraints by reviewing 
comment letters for peers. They might be able to use this information to mitigate the 
efficacy of the reviews, reducing the information content of their earnings while 
steering clear of high-risk areas. This behavior is consistent with theory suggesting that, 
if managers anticipate the content of SEC reviews, that should affect their reporting 
choices (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia 2000) and with the “constrained cop” theory, 
                                                          
2 U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, 2004, SEC staff to publicly release comment letter and responses. 





which suggests that firms may consider SEC constraints before deciding to commit a 
violation (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). The importance of this cost is ambiguous, because 
the disclosure of comment letters may also lead to greater learning by firm managers, 
which  may be beneficial because companies will have more guidance and may correct 
their filings based on the information in comment letters for other companies (Cassell et 
al. 2011). Additionally, the SEC’s decision to make firm reviews publicly available may 
affect the behavior of the managers at the firms being reviewed. They might be able to 
delay the disclosure of the comment letters by making requests for confidentiality or for 
extensions. As such, the effect of disclosing firm reviews is not clear ex ante. 
My study uses a two-pronged identification strategy to test the effect of making 
the SEC’s firm reviews public. First, I use a difference-in-differences method—
exploiting the shock created by the SEC’s decision to make comment letters public, 
multiple staggered oversight actions, and fixed effects. According to section 408 of the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX), all firms should be reviewed once every three years. Since 
all firms will eventually be treated, I divide them based on whether they were reviewed 
in the prior four quarters. This allows me to better identify the role that oversight plays 
in the improvement of a firm’s disclosure quality. I also use quarter, year, and industry 
fixed effects to separate market trends and absorb arbitrary shocks to quarterly liquidity 
and cost of capital within the groups (Christensen et al. 2013).  
Second, I address the concern that my results could reflect general time trends or 
market-wide changes, such as macroeconomic shocks, by utilizing a triple difference-in-
differences estimation. I use two groups of variables to exploit time and cross-sectional 
differences in the potential benefits and costs of the SEC’s decision to make comment 





disclosure timeliness and the extent of investor monitoring. To measure the costs, I 
partition the sample based on managers’ ability to anticipate the content of the reviews 
and influence its dissemination. For this second feature of my identification strategy to 
induce spurious results by chance, concurrent unrelated shocks to liquidity would have 
to line up with variations in the benefits and costs of this policy change.  
I focus on liquidity changes and the cost of capital around earnings 
announcements to measure the quality and precision of disclosure. I start by examining 
liquidity because this has been the primary metric suggested to evaluate the 
effectiveness of SEC enforcement actions (e.g., Jackson 2008; Bloomfield et al. 2009). 
There have been numerous empirical studies demonstrating the relationship between 
market liquidity and the cost of capital (Amihud and Mendelson 1986; Chordia et al. 
2001; Easley et al. 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh 2003), and liquidity can be measured 
over short intervals and with reasonably high frequency. Additionally, I specifically 
examine liquidity changes around earnings announcements for four reasons. First, this 
choice increases the power of my tests, because the main goal of the SEC’s firm reviews 
is to force managers to incorporate the SEC’s suggestions in future earnings 
announcements and filings (IG CSE Report 2008). Also, earnings announcements are 
the most important and widely publicized corporate disclosure events for a firm because 
of their impact on security prices (Basu et al. 2013).
3
 Second, earnings announcements 
are generally scheduled in advance (Chen and Mohan 1994; Drake et al. 2012). This 
allows investors to anticipate the date of the public disclosure, thus facilitating the 
timing of comment letter collection. Third, prior literature shows that information 
                                                          
3
 My focus on earnings announcements is supported by the large literature on the economic and statistical 
significance of market reactions to them (Kothari 2001). There is also a literature on market reactions around SEC 
filings. However, I choose not to focus on filings given the results of Li and Ramesh (2009) who find that market 





asymmetry increases temporarily during the earnings announcements period (e.g., Lee 
et al. 1993; Yohn 1998), due to the processing skills of sophisticated investors. Thus the 
information provided in the SEC’s firm reviews may reduce this temporary imbalance 
(Amiram, Owens, and Rozenbaum 2012). Finally, the theoretical and empirical 
literature focuses on short-horizon effects around earnings releases (Lee et al. 1993; 
Krinsky and Lee 1996; and Verdi 2012). 
In addition to changes in liquidity, I analyze the information content of earnings 
around earnings announcements. There is a significant literature on the incremental 
information content of earnings announcements (e.g., Roychowdhury et al. 2012).
4
 
Although earnings disclosures largely confirm information anticipated by market 
participants, they also release new information. In fact, earnings releases account for a 
significant proportion of the total variation in annual returns for a firm (Basu et al. 
2013). The relationship between the disclosure of the SEC’s firm reviews and earnings 
informativeness is an open empirical question, because this disclosure affects cost of 
capital and information asymmetry through different but interrelated channels (e.g., 
Gow, Taylor, and Verrecchia 2012; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2012; Armstrong, 
Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia  2011; Akins, Ng, and Verdi 2012). As a catch-all proxy 
for the channels through which disclosure affects the cost of capital, I use the price 
response to earnings information (the standardized unexpected earnings response 
coefficient) around earnings announcements.  
Using this setting and design, I estimate quarterly panel regressions from 2002 
to 2013. In my first test, I find that the comment letters affect information asymmetry 
differently in the pre- and post-periods. While the comment letters exacerbate 
                                                          





information asymmetry around earnings releases when they are private, they decrease it 
when they are public. In the private regime, this evidence is consistent with some 
investors either obtaining private signals or processing the information more efficiently 
than other investors (e.g., Penman 1982; Ke and Petroni 2004; Collins et al. 2003; Ke 
and Ramalingegowda 2005). In the public regime, the change in bid-ask spread 
increases as the SEC reviews become timelier, suggesting that disclosure of the SEC’s 
reviews is a substitute for the private information held by informed investors (Gow, 
Taylor, and Verrecchia 2012). Importantly, these findings are both statistically and 
economically significant. I can translate the reduction in bid-ask spread into an average 
trading cost savings of approximately $99,000 per year for each firm reviewed, which 
implies an average annual benefit of 0.16% of market capitalization. This magnitude is 
economically significant, especially when considering the recurring nature of the 
savings, but it is not too large to be implausible. For instance, should I extrapolate the 
annual savings to all the firms reviewed annually by the SEC, it would be 
approximately $377 million, which is equivalent to 3.2 times the average annual budget 
for the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance in my sample period ($117 million). 
Additionally, I find that the SEC’s firm reviews increase the information content of the 
associated earnings releases only when they are publicly available, and that this effect is 
stronger for companies with higher levels of investor monitoring. This prediction is 
consistent with the literature that relates shareholder behavior to financial reporting 
quality.  
To attempt to analyze the costs of the SEC making firm reviews public, my 
second set of tests examines the effects of the SEC’s policy change on oversight 





and decrease the information content of their firms’ earnings. However, I find mixed 
evidence that managers’ attempts to stifle reviews through confidentiality requests have 
negative capital-market effects. 
In robustness tests, I try to mitigate potential concerns of my research design. 
First, I address the alternative hypothesis that SEC oversight increases confound my 
results. To do so, I analyze the inputs and outputs of the oversight effort. I find that the 
SEC reviewed more firms following budget increases but that, on average, these 
reviews were conducted with lower oversight intensity. Second, I gauge the validity of 
my identification strategy with two additional tests. I examine whether investors 
consider the reviews to be material information, and I provide evidence that the capital-
market effects only arise when firm reviews are public. Next, I address self-selection 
issues analyzing the factors that determine the probability of review. Regardless of the 
number of factors I include, the ability of the model to discriminate is equivalent to 
tossing a coin. (That is, the area under the receiver operating characteristic curve is 
equal to 0.5.) This is intuitive because, as mandated by SOX, all firms are reviewed at 
least once every three years. This suggests that self-selection issues are not a primary 
concern. Finally, in additional analysis, I confirm that my results are robust to the 
possibility of auditors’ spillover effects before the SEC’s disclosure decision. 
I contribute to the literature in three ways. First, my work gives support to the 
idea that disclosing oversight actions helps investors to analyze the firm and carry out 
private oversight. Prior literature has shown that the market plays a supplemental role, 
meaning that private enforcement, through price declines and career consequences for 
managers, imposes additional penalties above and beyond those imposed by public 





private enforcement occur simultaneously does not necessarily mean that they work 
together. Prior literature does not demonstrate that the SEC and the market complement 
each other (i.e., that the SEC’s enforcement information helps the market to carry out 
enforcement). Prior literature is constrained in the ability to disentangle whether the 
greater penalties imposed by the market when they accompany public enforcement 
result from the SEC’s enforcement assistance or from the higher severity of the cases 
enforced. 
Along the same lines, I contribute to the literature on firm reviews. There is a 
nascent literature on the determinants and consequences of comment letters. In Europe, 
Christensen et al. (2013) point to a positive capital market effect in five EU countries 
that instituted a filing review process in conjunction with the adoption of IFRS. In the 
United States, prior research on comment letters can be organized into papers 
examining the characteristics of firms that receive the letters and those examining the 
consequences of their issuance (e.g., Ettredge et al. 2011; Robinson et al. 2011; Boone 
et al. 2013; Gietzmann and Pettinicchio 2014). Since these papers use only a sample 
period in which the letters were public, they are constrained in their ability to explain 
why disclosure of the SEC’s firm reviews has capital-market effects. To the best of my 
knowledge, my study is the first to document the capital-market effects of the SEC’s 
decision to make firm reviews public. 
Finally, I contribute to the body of research analyzing the channels through 
which disclosure affects information asymmetry and the cost of capital (Gow, Taylor, 
and Verrecchia 2012; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2012; Armstrong, Core, Taylor, 
and Verrecchia  2011; Akins, Ng, and Verdi 2012; Bhattacharya et al. 2013). My setting 





because the SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews influences information asymmetry and the 
cost of capital through different mechanisms.  
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the relevant background and 
hypotheses development. Section 3 presents the sample, discusses the identification 
strategy, and reports the results. Section 4 concludes. 
2. Relevant Background and Hypotheses Development  
2.1.  Institutional Background—SEC Comment Letter Process 
As required by federal law,
5
 the SEC’s Division of Corporation Finance must 
review the 10-K filings of each reporting company at least once every three years. The 
goal is to monitor and enhance compliance with the applicable accounting, legal, and 
disclosure requirements. If the division is satisfied with the filing, it will proceed 
without comment. However, if the division has a concern, it will open a dialogue with 
the company by sending it a “comment letter.” The company typically responds after 
consulting with its accountants and lawyers and, if necessary, either provides 
supplemental information in its subsequent filings or amends its past filings.
6
 While 
companies can often resolve the SEC’s concerns with simple explanations, the SEC 
may send additional comment letters if the initial conversation does not suffice. 
Comments and responses continue until the SEC staff is satisfied and sends a closing 
letter.  
On June 24, 2004, the SEC announced it would make public comment and 
response letters made after August 1, 2004. On May 12, 2005, the SEC actually began 
to release the correspondence forty-five days after each firm review was performed. The 
stated objective was to expand the transparency of the reviews, making the information 
                                                          
5 See the Section 408 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002. 





available to a broader audience free of charge. Before the announcement, comment and 
response letters were only available through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) 
requests. Accordingly, the letters were largely regarded as private correspondence. The 




The importance of the timeliness and publicity of SEC comment letters may be 
illustrated by an anecdote. Soon after Bear Stearns’s collapse in 2008, the SEC’s Office 
of Inspector General audited the SEC’s oversight of the investment bank (IG CSE 
Report 2008). In this audit, the inspector general criticized the lack of timeliness of the 
review, which the SEC did not initiate until more than 7.5 months after the annual 
report was filed, despite that, three months before the review was initiated, two Bear 
Stearns’ hedge funds had collapsed. Also, it took the SEC more than one year to make 
the review public—by then, Bear Stearns itself had collapsed. Two years later, the 
inspector general stated that this untimely review “deprived investors of material 
information that they could have used to make well informed investment decisions (i.e., 
whether to buy/sell Bear Stearns’ securities). In addition, the information obtained 
through the review process (e.g., Bear Stearns’ exposure to subprime mortgages) could 





2.2.  Hypotheses Development and Related Literature 
                                                          
7 See Office of Inspector General Audit Report No. 422, March 30, 2007, “Backlog of FOIA Requests For Comment 
Letters.” Additionally, the SEC was concerned about the asymmetric access to the letters by firms’ stakeholders. A 
conversation with Commissioner Harvey Goldschmid, who approved this regulatory change, confirmed this point. 
8





In the absence of complete enforcement,
9
 regulators must focus on the strategies 
that have proved to be more effective.
10
 One of these strategies concerns the disclosure 
of the SEC’s own enforcement actions. Dissemination of these enforcement actions may 
level the playing field across investors by providing less sophisticated investors either 
information that was previously held only by more sophisticated investors or a more 
straightforward interpretation of firms’ financial reporting. Thus the disclosure of firm 
reviews may substitute for the private information held by more sophisticated investors 
and thus reduce the information asymmetry (e.g., Diamond and Verrecchia, 1991; 
Amiram, Owens, and Rozembaum 2012). 
But some theoretical analyses show that more sophisticated investors may be apt 
to learn more from public information, either because of heterogeneity in the processing 
of information or the use of private useful information in conjunction with public 
information (e.g., Kim and Verrecchia 1994; Bushman et al. 1996; Fischer and 
Verrecchia 1999; Bloomfield 2002; Hirshleifer and Teoh 2003). Thus the disclosure of 
firm reviews may complement the information held by more sophisticated investors—
that is, new information disproportionately enhances the knowledge of sophisticated 
investors, aggravating the asymmetry among investors (e.g., Lee et al. 1993; Yohn 
1998; Gow, Taylor, and Verrecchia 2012; Kalay 2015). 
Furthermore, the effect of SEC firm reviews on information asymmetry may be 
intensified depending on the timeliness of the firm reviews. If the disclosure of SEC 
firm reviews substitutes for the information held by more sophisticated investors, 
disclosure may reduce the information asymmetry between investor classes as the 
                                                          
9 Cox et al. (2003) and Kedia and Rajgopal (2011) describe the various resources constraints imposed on the SEC. 
10 There is ample evidence that the SEC’s performance has room for improvement. Most of the evidence comes from 
the SEC inspector general and from former SEC chairmen, who have identified multiple failures its enforcement 
programs over time (U.S. SEC IG CSE Report 2008; U.S. SEC IG Madoff Report 2009; Paredes 2009; Katz 2010, 





information becomes timelier. Conversely, if the disclosure of SEC firm reviews 
complements the information held by more sophisticated investors, disclosure may 
aggravate the information asymmetry between investor classes as the information 
becomes timelier.  
Based on the above arguments, the relation between the disclosure of SEC 
reviews and information asymmetry is an open empirical question. Thus my predictions 
are stated in the null form: 
H1a: The disclosure of SEC firm reviews is not associated with a reduction in 
information asymmetry. 
H1b: The effects of the SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews on information 
asymmetry do not vary with the timeliness of those reviews. 
There is a significant literature on the incremental information content of 
earnings announcements (e.g., Roychowdhury et al. 2012). Although earnings 
disclosures play a confirmatory contracting role, they also reveal new information.  In 
fact, earnings releases account for an important proportion of the total variation in 
annual returns, and they are the most important and widely publicized recurrent 
corporate disclosure events for a firm (Basu et al. 2013). Prior literature has shown that 
SEC firm reviews help increase earnings informativeness (Johnston and Petacchi 2013). 
However, the relationship between disclosure of the SEC’s firm reviews and earnings 
informativeness is an open empirical question, because this disclosure affects cost of 
capital and information asymmetry through different but interrelated channels (e.g., 
Gow, Taylor, and Verrecchia 2012; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia 2012; Armstrong, 
Core, Taylor, and Verrecchia  2011; Akins, Ng, and Verdi 2012). Figure 1.2 





On the one hand, the literature shows that the market plays a supplemental 
enforcement role, meaning that private enforcement imposes additional penalties on top 
of those imposed by public enforcement. Also, this literature shows that the market 
imposes greater penalties than regulators on managers and firms through price declines 
and career consequences. For example, Karpoff et al. (2008b) show that firms lose 41% 
of their market values when news of its misconduct is reported. Of this amount, market 
penalties through reputation loss (i.e., expected losses due to lower sales and higher 
contracting and financing costs) are over 7.5 times greater than the costs imposed 
through the legal system, including SEC and Department of Justice fines and 
settlements of securities class-action lawsuits. Additionally, Karpoff et al. (2008a) show 
that, of 2,206 individuals identified by regulators as culpable parties, 93% lose their jobs 
during the violation or enforcement periods, and most of them are fired by their boards 
of directors (58%). They also find that the probability of removal is positively related to 
the size of the misconduct’s harm to shareholders and the quality of the firm’s 
governance, such as the presence of independent boards and the holdings of outside 
blockholders. On top of that, the SEC has barred or is in the process of barring a portion 
of them (31%) from future employment as an officer or director of a public firm. 
However, the fact that public and private enforcement occur simultaneously 
does not necessarily mean that they work together. Prior literature does not demonstrate 
that the SEC and the market complement each other—there is no evidence that the 
SEC’s enforcement information helps the market to carry out enforcement. Prior 
literature cannot disentangle whether the greater penalties imposed by the market when 
supplementing public enforcement result from the SEC’s implicit assistance or from the 





(Cox et al. 2003; Klausner 2009; Correia et al. 2012), and evidence suggests that the 
agency plays a minor role in identifying fraudulent misreporting: Dyck et al. (2010, 
2013) find that the SEC unearths only 6% of the cases. Also, Karpoff et al. (2008b) 
point out that most of the SEC actions are firm-initiated disclosures of potential 
problems, such as self-disclosures of malfeasance, restatements, auditor departures, or 
unusual trading.  
If SEC’s information does not help the market to carry out enforcement, the 
SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews may have no effect on earnings informativeness. But 
if the market complements the SEC, the disclosure of firm reviews may help improve 
earnings informativeness. Earnings releases are closely scrutinized by investors. Thus 
the public disclosure of oversight actions may help investors to identify accounting 
concerns and exert pressure on directors, officers, and other market participants to 
improve the information content of earnings (e.g., Bushee 1998; Fischer and Verrecchia 
2000; Chen et al. 2007; Ferri and Sandino 2009; Cox et al. 2010).  
Hence my second set of predictions is also stated in the null form: 
H2a: The SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews is not associated with an increase in 
the information content of earnings. 
H2b: The effects of the SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews on the information 
content of earnings do not vary with investors’ monitoring. 
Finally, the decision to make oversight actions public may be problematic 
because companies may be able to infer the SEC’s main concerns and constraints. 
Companies could then use this information to steer clear of high-risk areas to avoid 
detection, mitigating the efficacy of the reviews.
11
 This behavior is consistent with 
                                                          
11 As an example of high-risk area, Choi et al. (2013) show that the SEC shifted its mix of investigations toward 





theory that suggests that, if managers anticipate the content of SEC firm reviews, then it 
should affect their reporting (e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia 2000). It is also consistent 
with the constrained cop theory,
 
 which suggests that firms may consider the SEC’s 
constraints before deciding to commit a violation (Kedia and Rajgopal 2011). 
Conversely, the disclosure of comment letters leads to greater dissemination of 
information, which may be beneficial because companies will have more guidance and 
may correct their filings based on the information in comment letters for other 
companies (Cassell et al. [2011]).  
Additionally, the SEC’s decision to make firm reviews public may affect the 
behavior of the managers at the firms being reviewed. Managers, for example, can delay 
the disclosure of the comment letters by making requests for confidentiality, delays, or 
extensions.
12
 However, they may want to avoid asking for confidentiality requests 
because investors cannot distinguish requests motivated by proprietary costs from those 
motivated by the desire to hide bad news (Grossman and Hart 1980; Robinson et al. 
2011). 
Hence my final predictions are also stated in the null form: 
H3a: The effects of SEC reviews on information asymmetry and the information 
content of earnings are not affected by the SEC’s workload constraints. 
H3b: The effects of SEC reviews on information asymmetry and the information 
content of earnings are not affected by managers’ disclosure negotiations. 
                                                          
12 An episode that illustrates managers’ attempts to make information stale is the SEC’s review of Google between 
June 7, 2011, and January 25, 2012. In one letter, the SEC requested that Google justify reserving half a billion 
dollars to settle false advertising claims stemming from ongoing Department of Justice (DOJ) and other regulatory 
investigations and to explain why this amount was not recorded earlier. Google had full information about the 
settlement conditions of the DOJ investigation at the time the last correspondence letter was filed, dated January 24, 
2012, but the company preferred to keep certain details confidential. As a signal of Google’s attempts to keep these 
matter private, during the eight-month course of this review, the company filed four extensions of time and four 





Finally, my research differs from prior research on enforcement in two important 
respects. First, earlier research examines the most serious SEC enforcement actions 
(Feroz et al. 1991; Beneish 1999), whereas I focus on comment letters. Unlike the most 
serious enforcement actions, which are rare, comment letter reviews are common and 
happen earlier in investigations. Second, although a nascent literature addresses the 
determinants and consequences of comment letter reviews, these studies are constrained 
in their ability to provide insight on the channels through which the SEC disclosure of 
firm reviews has capital-market effects. In Europe, Christensen et al. (2013) show 
positive capital market effects in the five EU countries that instituted filing review 
processes in conjunction with the adoption of IFRS. In the United States, research 
conducted using comment letters can be organized into studies examining the 
characteristics of firms that receive the letters (e.g., Hribar et al. 2010; Cassell et al. 
2011; Johnston and Petacchi 2013; Boone et al. 2013; Gietzmann and Isidro 2013; 
Blackburne 2014; Ettredge et al. 2011; Robinson et al. 2011) and those examining the 
consequences of issuing comment letters (e.g., Ertimur and Nondorf 2006; Robinson et 
al. 2011; Cassell et al. 2011; Boone et al. 2013; Gietzmann and Isidro 2013; Dechow et 
al. 2014; Gietzmann and Pettinicchio 2014; Gao et al. 2010; Johnston and Petacchi 
2013; Bozanic et al. 2014; Blackburne 2014; Johnson 2014; Ryans 2014; Brown et al. 
2014). To the best of my knowledge, my study is the first to document whether the 
SEC’s decision to make these oversight actions public caused any oversight 
improvement. 
3.  Sample, Research Design, and Results 





I use the Comment Letters database from Audit Analytics and a proprietary 
comment letter database compiled through FOIA requests to collect comment letters 
issued by the SEC from 2002 through 2013. I start in 2002, since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act of 2002 mandates that all firms should be reviewed once every three years. Before 
2002, the reviews were selectively done based on private criteria. Considering that 
annual reports are the disclosures most frequently demanded from EDGAR (Drake et al. 
2013) and that annual report reviews comprise 77% of all periodic filing reviews, I 
focus exclusively on annual report reviews. Thus I exclude comment letters that do not 
include comments relating to 10-K filings. I aggregate Audit Analytics’ comment letter 
observations pertaining to the same firm review using the unique Audit Analytics 
identifier Comment Letter Conversation ID. I also exclude firms from which I do not 
have comment letters in a three-year cycle.
13
 Table 1 details the filters used to select the 
sample, and Appendix B lists the sources and definitions for each variable. This 
selection procedure results in a maximum of 77,057 firm-quarter observations with 
complete data. Table 2.A displays the samples for both the public and private regimes. 
Because I have a subsample of the comment letters issued by the SEC in the private 
regime, there are differences in the composition of the sample across these two regimes. 
Firms in the public regime tend to be larger, more mature, and less volatile. Table 2.B 
shows descriptive statistics for the sample across the partitioning variables I will use in 
my triple difference-in-differences analysis. Specifically, to measure heterogeneity in 
the disclosure benefits, I divide the firms based on whether they are higher or lower than 
the median values for the two following partitioning variables: SEC reviews’ timeliness 
                                                          
13 These firms have supposedly been reviewed by the SEC but have not triggered the issuance of comment letters. 
The reason is that the SEC carries out preliminary reviews, which may lead it to decide not to continue a more 
comprehensive review (see OIG Audit No. 401 2006). I exclude these observations because I cannot determine when 
and to which extent they have been reviewed. Also, I perform two robustness tests to rule out the possibility that this 
filter is driving the results. I find that neither the intensity of the SEC oversight (Table 7) nor the characteristics of the 





and investors’ monitoring. Also, to measure heterogeneity in the disclosure costs, I 





 for the partitioning variable SEC reviews’ content predictability, and 
whether they ask for confidentiality requests for the partitioning variable managers’ 
disclosure negotiation. In general, for the samples with higher partitioning values, the 
firms are bigger, less volatile, slightly more mature, and have a lower frequency of 
losses. 
3.2.  SEC Oversight Disclosure and Capital Market Effects 
I use an identification strategy with two features to try to provide a causal 
inference (see Figures 1.1. to 1.5). First, I use a difference-in-differences model with 
fixed effects to exploit the shock created by the SEC’s decision to disclose multiple 
staggered oversight actions. One concern with using a regulatory shock is that this 
change is often put in place after major economic events, so markets may respond to 
these preceding events rather than to the new regulation itself (e.g., Ball 1980; Mulherin 
2007). For example, Enron and other scandals might have simultaneously increased the 
market’s demand for both greater disclosure quality and stricter SEC review. To address 
this concern, my study uses the SEC’s oversight actions across different points in time. 
According to section 408 of the Sarbanes Oxley Act, all firms should be reviewed once 
every three years, so the SEC reviews roughly one-third of the registrants annually. 
Since all firms will eventually be treated, I create a dummy variable set to 1 for the four 
quarterly reports issued following the receipt of the first letter in a SEC´s conversation 
review and 0 otherwise (see Figure 1.3). This staggered implementation allows me to 
have a better identification of the role that oversight plays in the improvement of a 





separate market trends and absorb arbitrary shocks to quarterly liquidity and cost of 
capital within the groups (Christensen et al. 2013). As a result of this identification 
strategy, for market demand to induce spurious results by chance, the market would 
have to induce concurrent changes to firm’s disclosure policies that line up with the 
staggered oversight actions performed by the SEC.
14
 To implement the first feature of 
my identification strategy, I use the following OLS regression models: 
∆𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟑𝑺𝑬𝑪 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘𝒙𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝛽𝜆𝜆 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +
∑ 𝛽𝛾𝛾 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (1) 
𝐴𝑏𝑛_𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝑆𝐸𝐶 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟕𝑺𝑼𝑬𝒙𝑺𝑬𝑪 𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘𝒙𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕 +
∑ 𝛽𝜆𝜆 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛾𝛾 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝜑𝜑 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (2) 
The dependent variables are proxies for the capital-market effects of the SEC’s 
firm reviews around earnings announcements. ΔBidask is computed as the average bid-
ask spread over the (−1, +1) day window around the earnings announcement minus the 
average bid-ask spread over the previous quarter (−60, −7). Abn_Ret is computed as the 
average abnormal returns over the (−3, +3) day window around the earnings 
announcement. The abnormal return is the raw return minus the average value-weighted 
return on a same size-B/M portfolio (six portfolios), as provided by Professor French. 
SUE is unexpected earnings for each respective firm-quarter based on the median of 
analyst forecasts issued within 90 days of the quarter’s earnings announcement deflated 
by share price at the end of the quarter. Analyst forecasts and actual earnings are taken 
                                                          
14 Anecdotal evidence shows that the firm reviews provide unique information to the market. For example, SEC 
Insight Inc. explained in a letter of comments to the SEC’s policy change that “to the average securities analyst or 
investor, the SEC Staff is in the enviable position of being able to ask, and often secure the answers to questions that 
are frequently dodged, dismissed, or ignored by a registrant when asked by a non-regulator” (Sept. 30, 2004). Also, 
Muddy Waters, whose analyst reports triggered $7 billion in losses for Chinese stocks, said “the SEC’s accountants 
do a good job of spotting issues in the companies’ filings …. We’ve read some astute questions from the SEC on a 





from I/B/E/S and adjustment factors from CRSP. I use the I/B/E/S detailed EPS and 
then aggregate those forecasts to create consensus estimates.
15
 There are two 
experimental variables. SEC Review is a binary variable set to 1 for the four firm-
quarters immediately after the SEC sent the first letter to the firm and 0 otherwise; 
PUBLIC is a binary indicator variable that takes on the value of 1 for firm-years 
beginning in the date after the SEC made the comment letters publicly available, that is, 
May of 2005. Controlsγ denotes a set of firm level control variables used in the literature 
(e.g., Wilson 2008; Johnston and Petacchi 2013; Blackburne 2014). Fixed Effectsλ 
represents firm, industry, and separate quarter-year fixed effects for the corresponding 
groups.
16
 Because the oversight is carried out at the firm level, I draw statistical 
inferences based on standard errors clustered by firm and quarter-year.  
Table 3 presents the results from estimating the relation between the SEC 
disclosure of firm reviews and the information asymmetry around earnings 
announcements. In the private regime, I find a statistically significant positive relation 
between the SEC reviews and the changes in bid-ask spreads in all specifications. This 
evidence is consistent with a complementary relation between greater information in 
earnings and private information, which suggests that more sophisticated investors 
either obtain private signals or process the information more efficiently than other 
investors (e.g., Penman 1982; Ke and Petroni 2004; Collins et al. 2003; Ke and 
Ramalingegowda 2005). The direction of this relation flips in the public regime, which 
suggests that the disclosure of the SEC’s reviews substitutes for the private information 
held by more informed investors. Importantly, this change in coefficients is both 
                                                          
15 When this information is missing, the expected value of earnings is calculated as EPS for the same quarter in the 
prior year (adjusted for stock splits through the current quarter). 
16 Companies are assigned to one of the 12 SEC division offices by four-digit SIC codes so that filings are reviewed 
by industry experts. See http://www.sec.gov/info/edgar/siccodes.htm for a listing of four-digit SIC codes and the 





statistically and economically significant. An F-test for differences between the public 
and private regimes’ coefficients indicates that the difference is statistically significant 
(p-value <0.01). Also, I can translate the reduction in bid-ask spread into an average 
trading cost savings of approximately US $99,000 per year for each firm reviewed, 
which implies an average annual benefit of 0.16% of market capitalization. This 
magnitude is economically significant, especially when considering the recurring nature 
of the savings. For example, should I extrapolate the savings to all firms reviewed 
annually by the SEC, the annual savings would be approximately $377 million, which is 
equivalent to 3.2x the average annual budget for the SEC’s Division of Corporation 
Finance in my sample period ($117 million). 
Next, Table 4 provides evidence of the effect of the SEC’s disclosure of firm 
reviews on earnings informativeness around earnings announcements. In the private 
regime, I find a negative but insignificant relation between the SEC reviews and the 
standardized unexpected earnings. As I illustrate in Figure 1.2, it is difficult to 
disentangle whether the negative relation is driven by an increased information 
asymmetry among investors, a reduction of average precision of information among 
investors, or a combination of both. However, the direction of this relation flips in the 
public regime. This relation is now positive, statistically significant, and economically 
meaningful in all specifications. Also, an F-test for differences between the public and 
private regimes’ coefficients indicates that the difference is statistically significant (p-
value <0.03). This evidence suggests that the market and the SEC’s oversight actions 
are complementary, which is consistent with the literature that relates shareholder 
behavior to firms’ financial reporting.
17
 
                                                          
17 I also re-run Table 4 adding quarterly lead and lag returns as additional independent variables (e.g., Kothari 2001). 





3.3.  Heterogeneity in the Benefits of the SEC’s Oversight Disclosure 
The second feature of my identification strategy is a triple difference-in-
differences model. I use two partitioning variables to exploit time and cross-sectional 
differences in the potential benefits of the SEC’s decision to make comments letters 
publicly available. Note that for this second feature of my identification strategy to 
induce spurious results by chance, concurrent unrelated shocks to liquidity would have 
to line up with variations in the benefits and costs of the SEC’s policy change. 
To analyze the investors’ ability to act on the SEC’s information, I use two 
partitioning variables. First, in the information asymmetry test, I use as partitioning 
variable the timeliness with which the SEC´s reviews are disseminated. I calculate the 
SEC’s disclosure timeliness as the number of days between a firm’s 10K filing and the 
start of the SEC’s firm review plus the number of days between the end of the SEC’s 
firm review and the SEC dissemination of the review content in EDGAR.
18
 The start of 
the SEC’s firm review is a decision that does not correlate with firms’ quality (e.g., IG 
CSE Report 2008), so the choice of this variable does not raise endogeneity issues. 
Also, I do not include in the computations the examination period, since prior research 
has used the number of days between the first and the last comment letter as a measure 
of the severity of the reviews with mixed evidence. On the one hand, Johnston et al. 
(2013) find that investors’ reaction is greater, the longer the examination period. On the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
noise is mitigated if an instrumental variable that is correlated with the measurement error in unexpected earnings but 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable is included in the regression. The coefficient on the lagged stock return 
variable is negative, indicating that the variable is useful in reducing measurement errors. Second, I also include lead 
returns to control for the effect of post-earnings announcement drifts. As expected, the coefficient in the lead returns 
is positive. Inferences from the results are unaltered. 
18 The SEC’s internal policy for comments on annual reports was to “send a comment letter to a firm prior to the 
firm’s next fiscal year-end.” Thus it might take eight months for the SEC to even contact a company about a deficient 
annual report and longer for that company to file an amended report (U.S. House of Representatives, 111th Congress, 









Second, in the earnings informativeness test, I use as partitioning variable the 
level of investors’ monitoring. I operationalize the level of investors’ monitoring using 
nontransient investors’ firm holdings as a proxy. Nontransient investors are defined as 
investors specializing in the monitoring of firms, and so they are the most concerned 
about and have the competency to assess the quality of accounting reports (Gietzmann 
and Isidro 2013). Typically, these investors operate with low turnover (Bushee 1998; 
Chen et al. 2007). 
These two partitioning variables exhibit enough time-series and cross-sectional 
variation to help me in the identification strategy. The SEC average review timeliness 
by Q1 through Q4 quartiles is 389 days, 246 days, 173 days, and 105 days, respectively. 
The average investor’s monitoring by Q1 through Q4 quartiles is 17%, 42%, 58%, and 
74%, respectively. Figure 2.1 plots the cross-sectional distribution of the SEC review 
timeliness over the 2005 to 2013 period. 
The following tests expand Equations (1) and (2) to analyze the variation in the 
benefits of the SEC’s disclosure change. Figures 1.3 to 1.5 illustrate graphically the 
identification strategy adopted. In Equations (3) and (4), I replace the indicator variable 
SEC Review with two non-overlapping indicators, which are defined generally as (i) 
oversight actions that have high values in the partitioning variables (ii) oversight actions 
that have low values in the partitioning variables. These two non-overlapping variables, 
SECReview_Low and SECReview_High, are the interaction of SEC Review and Low 
and High realizations of the partitioning variables, respectively. Thus, in this 
                                                          
19 I also look at the correlation between the length of the examination process and my partitioning variable, and the 





specification, I can directly compare the capital market effects of making the SEC 
oversight actions publicly available across the two groups of treatment firms. 
∆𝐵𝑖𝑑𝑎𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽4𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝜷𝟓𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘_𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒙𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝛽𝜆𝜆 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 +
∑ 𝛽𝛾𝛾 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡  (3) 
𝐴𝑏𝑛𝑅𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑡 =
𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡
+ 𝛽3𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽5𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽6𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽7𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑖𝑡 +
𝛽8𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐻𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽9𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝑆𝐸𝐶𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑖𝑒𝑤_𝐿𝑜𝑤𝑥𝑃𝑢𝑏𝑙𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡 +
𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑺𝑼𝑬𝒙𝑺𝑬𝑪𝑹𝒆𝒗𝒊𝒆𝒘_𝑯𝒊𝒈𝒉𝒙𝑷𝒖𝒃𝒍𝒊𝒄𝒊𝒕 + ∑ 𝛽𝜆𝜆 𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑 𝐸𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑠𝑖 + ∑ 𝛽𝛾𝛾 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝜑𝜑 𝑆𝑈𝐸𝑥𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑚 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡     (4) 
Table 5 contains the results of this analysis. Panel A reports the results of 
estimating cross-sectional variation in the relationship between SEC disclosure 
timeliness and information asymmetry around earnings announcements. The evidence is 
consistent with more timely SEC reviews resulting in a greater reduction in information 
asymmetry. Panel B reports finer partitions using quartiles. There is no clear pattern in 
the private regime; if anything, there is an increase in the information asymmetry, 
consistent with more timely information aggravating information asymmetry across 
investors. However, in the public regime, there is a monotonic and statistically 
significant reduction in information asymmetry for more timely SEC reviews. In fact, 
the higher quartile shows evidence consistent with a relative reduction of the bid-ask 
spread (coefficient of −0.006%). Just this reduction accounts for cost savings equals to 





Next, in Panel C, I carry out a triple difference-in-differences analysis of the 
relationship between earnings informativeness and the extent of investors’ monitoring. 
The difference in standardized unexpected earnings’ coefficients between the public and 
private regimes equals 12.89 (p-value<0.05). However, in the public regime, the 
coefficient on SUE x SEC Review High is not higher than the coefficient on SUE x SEC 
Review Low. To further explore this result, I carry out finer partitions in Panel D. 
Although I do not find a clear pattern in the private regime, the coefficient increases 
with the extent of investors’ monitoring in the public regime, with the exception of the 
last quartile. This S-shaped relationship may be consistent with the evidence in Johnson 
et al. (2000), suggesting that a second type of agency problem may arise at higher levels 
of managerial ownership: entrenched managers may expropriate the rights of minority 
shareholders. The results without this last quartile are even economically stronger, and 
an F-test for differences between the public and private regimes’ coefficients indicates 
that the difference is statistically significant (p-value <0.01). 
3.4.  Heterogeneity in the Costs of the SEC’s Oversight Disclosure  
As discussed earlier, a potential cost associated with the SEC’s disclosure 
decision is managers’ ability to reduce the SEC’s oversight efficacy. To capture this 
cost, I use two additional partitioning variables. My first partitioning variable is the 
manager’s ability to predict the content of the SEC reviews. To operationalize this 
variable, I exploit the existence of SEC’s workload pressures. As noted in the SEC 
Office of Inspector Audit No. 401 (2006), approximately two-thirds of firms have a 
December 31 fiscal year-end. These companies are required to file their 10-Ks by mid-
March of the following year. The surge of filings creates a workload management issue 





the time to review and the number of comments are the same (see Figure 2.2).
20
 Thus I 
define as high workload and consequently High manager’s ability to predict the content 
of the SEC’s reviews a firm that has fiscal year-end between October 1 and March 31. 
As a validity test, I show in Figure 2.3 that, when the SEC’s workload is high, the 
industry comments resemble more the prior year’s comments (cosine similarity equal to 
0.90), than when the workload is low (cosine similarity equal to 0.72). Finally, Figure 
2.4 illustrates that the SEC has not implemented strategies to reduce the predictability of 
its reviews, such as reducing the industry persistence, within-industry similarity review 
content, starting the reviews across industries and years simultaneously, or some 
combination of these. 
My second partitioning variable is the manager’s ability to negotiate the 
disclosure of the reviews. To operationalize this variable, I use as a proxy whether a 
firm requests confidentiality requests, which are used to redact portions of the reviews. 
A firm that asks for confidentiality may signal either a desire to protect proprietary 
information or a desire to withhold bad news. This may raise concerns that this partition 
is just sorting on firms’ earnings precision, but there are three mitigating factors for this 
claim. First, I have already tested the main effect across regimes and found that the 
disclosure of firm reviews reduces information asymmetry and improves earnings 
informativeness. Second, the link between the use of confidentiality requests and the 
seriousness of the SEC reviews is not clear (Robinson et al. 2011). Finally, although the 
number of requests increased in the public regime, confidentiality requests were also 
available in the private regime (rule 17 C.F.R. 200.83; OIG Audit No. 479 2010). Thus 
the increase in confidentiality request in the public regime seems more related to 
                                                          
20 The workload is greater if we consider that, on average, 87% of the exemption letters that the SEC grants under 





managers’ reactions to the SEC’s change in disclosure policy than to a change in the 
average firm’s earnings precision.  
The results of Table 6 are partially consistent with managers’ reaction to the 
SEC’s disclosure decision mitigating oversight efficacy. Panels A and B report the 
results of estimating cross-sectional variation in the relationship between managers’ 
ability to anticipate the content of the reviews or managers’ disclosure negotiations and 
the capital market effects of these actions. Regarding SEC reviews’ content 
predictability, the evidence is not statistically significant but is consistent with the 
theory that the SEC’s decision to disclose its firm reviews has mitigated oversight 
efficacy. The difference in coefficients between the public and private regimes is 
positive for bid-ask spread (0.011%), and negative for earnings informativeness 
(−16.54). However, evidence on managers’ disclosure negotiations after the SEC’s 
disclosure change is mixed and not statistically significant: both the information 
asymmetry and the information content of earnings increase. This mixed evidence may 
suggest that not all the confidentiality requests aim to hide bad news, which is 
consistent with the findings by Robinson et al. (2011) that compensation disclosure 
defects are not associated with the number of confidentiality requests. 
3.5.  Alternative Hypothesis: Increase in SEC Oversight 
I try to mitigate several concerns of my research design. First, I address the 
alternative hypothesis that increases in the SEC’s oversight confound my results. To 
address this alternative explanation, I analyze the inputs and outputs of the oversight 
effort. First, I show that the SEC Division of Corporation Finance’s budget correlates 







 I illustrate this point in Figure 3; the correlation between the SEC 
Division of Corporation Finance’s budget (left axis) and the number of firms reviewed 
(right axis) is 0.84.
22
 However, the correlation between the SEC Division of 
Corporation Finance’s budget and the intensity of the SEC’s review (right axis) is null. 
Thus the size of the SEC’s budget is related to the number of firms treated, which helps 




Second, I look at the outputs of the firm reviews to control for other dimensions 
of oversight intensity. For the private regime, I use the exact same taxonomy used in the 
public regime.
24
 Table 7 presents the results. Panel A analyzes the content of the 
comment letters. All the metrics used show that the intensity of the reviews was reduced 
in the public regime. An exception is the number of rounds, but the median difference is 
zero, and the magnitude is relatively minor. 
Finally, Panel B analyzes the impact of SEC firm reviews in misstatements, 
which are extreme cases of low earnings precision. I use four proxies to measure 
misstatements: (1) the absolute impact of the restatements on stockholders’ equity, (2) 
the number of quarterly Section 302 internal control weakness disclosures, (3) the 
number of quarterly Section 302 internal control weakness disclosures in which a past 
restatement is not disclosed either directly or indirectly, and (4) the Accounting and 
Governance ratings (AGRs).
25
 These four metrics may overlap but also complement 
                                                          
21 These findings are consistent with the SEC’s view that “the benefit of improving reviews of a smaller number of 
filings would not justify the loss of reviewing a larger number of filings” (IG Audit 1998). 
22 Figures are extracted from the SEC 2002 through 2012 Performance and Accountability Reports. 
23 There is evidence that the intensity of the SEC oversight was not affected by an increase in other SEC’s tasks, such 
as answering staff no-action, interpretation and exemption letters or reviewing foreign private issuers registering. In 
fact, the number of letters decreased from 78 in 2004 to 63 in 2011, and the number of new foreign private issuers 
declined from 74 in 2005 to 25 in 2009 (SEC Performance and Accountability Reports 2002 through 2012). 
24 I retained Audit Analytics to apply the same taxonomy on the private letters sought through FOIA requests. 





each other. I use Section 302 quarterly disclosures instead of Section 404 annual 
disclosures because the former is supposed to be timelier.
26
 Also, I use AGR rating as a 
predictor of restatements, because sometimes accounting violations are not 
accompanied by contemporary restatements.
 27
 I run OLS regressions in all the 
specifications, because the use of fixed effects estimators in nonlinear models such as 
logit and probit specifications suffers from the “incidental parameter problem”; that is, 
it produces upwardly biased estimates, particularly when the number of years fixed 
effects in a panel is small (Greene 2004).  
The results show that, although the number of restatements and disclosures of 
internal control weaknesses have remained consistent over time, the impact of SEC 
reviews on those misstatements has decreased. Similarly, the impact of SEC reviews on 
AGR ratings has decreased. Overall, this evidence helps refute the alternative 
hypothesis that increased oversight during the public regime has confounded my 
analysis. 
3.6.  Alternative Research Design and Self-Selection Issues 
I also gauge the validity of my identification strategy with two additional tests. 
First, I use an alternative research design to examine whether investors react to the 
disclosure of firms reviews around their dissemination dates. In Table 8, I provide 
evidence that the capital-market effects only load significantly when firm reviews are 
                                                          
26 Anecdotal evidence may illustrate this point. In May of 2012, JPMorgan Chase announced a trading loss of over $2 
billion related to aggressive positions taken by one of its traders in credit default swaps that was subsequently revised 
to over $6 billion. Section 302 quarterly disclosure control reports for the periods ended June 30 and Sept. 30, 2012, 
identified control deficiencies related to the CIO valuation control process. However, by the time of the 10-K filing, 
management had taken steps to remediate the material weakness and the section 404 report was clear 
(http://www.auditanalytics.com/blog/). 
27 Anecdotal evidence may illustrate this point. The SEC found that Morgan Stanley valued certain impaired aircraft 
in its aircraft leasing business in late 2001, late 2002, and early 2003 and certain bonds in its high-yield bond 
portfolio in late 2000 in a manner that did not comply with generally accepted accounting principles. However, 
although the resolution of this investigation did not involve any restatement of past financial statements, Morgan 
Stanley’s AGR score moved from “average” (between P25 to P75) in the first half of 2000, to “aggressive” (P35-P10) 





publicly available. In Panel A, the bid-ask spread is reduced on average around the 
dissemination of firm reviews, which is consistent with firm reviews disclosure leveling 
the playing field across investors. In Panel B, the market reacts negatively around the 
dissemination of firm reviews, which is consistent with firm reviews signaling material 
information about firms’ lack of quality. My results suggest stronger capital market 
effects in the public regime, which is consistent with the findings in Tables 3 and 4.  
Second, I address the possibility that the probability of being reviewed is not 
random. The SEC is obliged to review every listed company at least once every three 
years (SOX, section 408). Hence endogeneity issues related to an omitted variable bias 
are unlikely to drive my results. However, because some of the firms are reviewed more 
often than once every three years, I only have a portion of the comment letters in the 
private regime, and some of the reviews do not end up on the release of comment 
letters, so I need to consider the possibility that a significant variable is left out from the 
model specification.  
In Table 9, I present evidence of the determinants of receiving an SEC firm 
review. I group the factors in those explicitly mandated in SOX Section 408 and those 
related to other company and monitoring characteristics. I estimate two specifications in 
each regime. The first specification includes all the observations, and the second one 
includes only a subsample of the observations that have been reviewed once in a three-
year cycle.
28
 In Figure 4, I illustrate that in the public regime, regardless of the number 
of factors I include, in both specifications the ability of the model to discriminate is not 
                                                          
28 I use a logit model without fixed effects, because the use of fixed effects estimators in nonlinear models such as 
logit and probit specifications suffers from the “incidental parameter problem”; i.e., it produces upwardly biased 
estimates, particularly when the number of years fixed effects in a panel is small (Greene 2004). Also, I run OLS 
regressions when using interaction terms, because Ai and Norton (2003) argue that it is often infeasible to calculate 
marginal effects from interaction terms in probit and logit models. The reason is that, in a nonlinear model, the 
magnitude of the interaction effect depends on all the covariates in the model, and not even the sign of the coefficient 






different than “tossing a coin” (i.e., the area under the receiver operating characteristic, 
or ROC, curve equals 0.5). This suggests that self-selection issues are not a primary 
concern in the public regime. However, in the private regime, the ability of the model to 
discriminate indicates acceptable discrimination (i.e., the area under the ROC curve 
equals 0.77). This result is likely due to sample self-selection, because I only have a 
portion of all the comment letters. In columns (5) and (6) of Panel A, I show that only a 
few factors are significantly different in both regimes. However, to try to mitigate 
endogeneity issues, I add all the determinants used in Panel A as control variables in the 
main tables in Panels B and C. The results and inferences stay intact. 
3.7.  Other Robustness 
Finally, I perform additional tests to confirm that my results are robust to other 
findings in the literature and to analyze the possibility of auditors’ spillover effects 
before the SEC’s disclosure decision. First, Blackburne (2014) claims that industry-
level political activity influences the intensity of regulatory oversight (i.e., the SEC’s 
budget allocation across SEC offices) and that this variation in the intensity of oversight 
affects managers’ reporting incentives. In his research design, he implicitly assumes that 
the regulatory oversight is applied ratably across the firms within the industry, whether 
or not they are reviewed.
29
 If that were true, the distinction between treatment and 
control groups within industries would be basically meaningless, so my tests would be 
biased against my findings, particularly in the specifications in which I use year and 
SEC-office fixed effects. Hence this alternative explanation is not confounding my 
results. 
                                                          
29 In fact, once you redefine this SEC_oversight variable in terms of number of firms actually treated, the time 





Second, Gow, Taylor, and Verrecchia (2012) show that, consistent with a 
complementary relation between earnings and private information, more precise 
earnings information leads to a larger increase in information asymmetry. However, my 
empirical evidence shows a substitution effect. In untabulated results, to control for the 
persistence in earnings, I add the variables predict and persistence to Panel A of Table 
5. Though the predict variable loads positively, as described in Gow et al. (2012), my 
main result is still significant with almost the same magnitude. Thus my findings 
suggest that the increase in earnings precision due to firm reviews helps to level the 
playing field across investors beyond the general complementary effect in Gow et al. 
(2012). 
Finally, I analyze whether audit firms created a spillover effect. Before 2005, top 
audit firms had access to their customers’ comment letters.30 Thus their clients may have 
already been aware of the SEC’s main concerns. If so, the decision to release the 
comment letters publicly would had have a limited impact on the clients of top audit 
firms. This is not necessarily problematic since, on average, small firms have poorer 
information environments. Hence, even if the small firms’ managers were the only ones 
benefiting from the SEC’s decision, the net effect of that decision would be worth 
analyzing. Small firms generally have lower analyst following, lower institutional 
ownership, and higher disclosure costs (Johnston et al. 2010). Thus the importance of 
the SEC’s decision may be relatively stronger for small firms. In untabulated results, I 
re-run the analysis in Table 6 with an additional partitioning variable, an indicator 
variable denoting whether a firm has been reviewed and audited by a Big Four 
accounting firm. The results indicate that neither information asymmetry nor earnings 
                                                          
30 Anecdotal evidence provided by a former senior audit manager at PricewaterhouseCoopers LLP suggested that Big 





informativeness is affected by this partition, and that the effects are not significant and 
small in magnitude. Additionally, anecdotal evidence suggests that auditors were 
helping firms to address comment letters issues ex post, which suggests that, on 
average, if this audit spillover effect existed, it did not succeed. 
4. Conclusion 
I examine capital-market implications of the SEC’s decision to make firm 
reviews public. Using a unique database of comment letters issued before 2005, I show 
that the disclosure of firm reviews levels the playing field, reducing information 
asymmetry for more timely SEC reviews. My analysis also shows that the SEC’s 
decision increased earnings informativeness. This effect is greater for firms with more 
monitoring by investors, which is consistent with public and private oversight 
complementing each other. However, there are costs associated with making the 
reviews publicly available. Primarily, public disclosure increases the managers’ ability 
to predict the content of the reviews, which reduces oversight efficacy. In some 
instances, this greater predictive ability may reduce earnings informativeness and hence 
oversight efficacy.  
My findings may matter to investors and regulators. Investors may want to 
demand the SEC, firms, or both to disclose information on firm reviews more promptly. 
From a regulatory perspective, my results highlight that more disclosure of oversight 
actions may benefit the capital markets and that these effects could be greater if 
accompanied by changes in the content of the firm reviews’ that reduce their 
predictability. However, a caveat about my study is that other unexplored channels may 





information asymmetry nor the cost of capital can be used as a sole proxy for welfare 
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Appendix A. Types of Comments 
I. Accounting Rules and Disclosures  
Accounts receivable & cash reporting issues Acquisitions, mergers, and business combinations 
Asset retirement obligation (FAS 143) issues Asset sales, disposals, divestitures, reorganization issues 
Balance sheet classification of assets issues Capitalization of expenditures issues 
Cash flow statement (FAS- 95 or IAS 7) classification errors Changes in accounting estimates issues 
Changes in accounting principles and interpretation  Comprehensive income (Equity Section) issues 
Consolidation (Fin 46, variable interest, SIV, SPE & off-B/S) Consolidation, foreign currency/inflation issue 
Contingencies & Commit, legal, (FAS 5 or IAS 37)  Debt and/or equity classification issues 
Debt, quasi-debt, warrants & equity ( BCF) security issues Deferred, stock-based and/or executive comp issues 
Deferred, stock-based options backdating only Deferred, stock-based SFAS 123 only (subcategory) 
Depreciation, depletion or amortization reporting  Dividend and/or distribution issues 
EPS, ratio and classification of income statement issues Expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues 
Fair value measurement, estimates, use (incl. VSOE) Fin statement segment reporting ((FAS 131) subcategory) issues 
Financial derivatives/hedging (FAS 133) acct issues Foreign (affiliate or subsidiary) issues 
Gain or loss recognition issues Intercompany accounting issues 
Inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales issues Investment in subs./affiliate issues 
Investments (SFAS 115) and cash and cash equivalents issues Lease, leasehold (FAS 13 (98) and IAS 17) 
Liabilities, payables, and accrual estimate issues Loans receivable, valuation and allowances issues 
Loss reserves (LAEs, Reinsurance) disclosure issues Non-monetary exchange (APB 29, EITF 01-2) issues 
Pension and related Employee Plan issues Percentage of completion 
PPE fixed asset (value/diminution) issues PPE issues - Intangible assets and goodwill 
Research and Development issues Revenue recognition (incl. deferred revenue) issues 
Subsidiary issues-- US or foreign (subcategory) Tax expense/benefit/deferral/other (FAS 109) issues 
Tax rate disclosure issues  
II. Disclosure and Internal Controls  
Accuracy of financial statement given DC/IC deficiency Changes in internal controls (IC)--disclose 
Incorrect language for DC/IC disclosure Material weakness in DC/IC--disclose who discovered 
Material weakness in DC/IC--fully disclose Material weakness in DC/IC--impact on fin statements 
Material weakness in DC/IC--proposed remedies Non-effectiveness of DCs/ICs--needs to be stated explicitly 
Timetable needed for remedy of DC/IC deficiency 8-K Disclosure issues 
III. Event Disclosure  
Audit(or) consent re: opinions in f/s issues Audit(or) Independence/PCAOB reg. issues 
Auditor departure disclosure issues Exchange Act Rule 10b-5 issues 
Exchange Act Rule 12b-15 issues Exchange Act Rule 12b-25 issues 
Regulation S-X, Rule 3-02 issues Restatement, accounting error- disclosure issues 
SEC triggered restatement  
IV. Federal Securities Laws 
1933 Act, § 4 issues (exempt transactions) 1933 Act, § 5 issues (prohibition against selling material) 
1933 Securities Act, § 3 issues (exempt securities) 1934 Act, § 12 issues (securities registration) 
1940 Act, § 3 issues (inadvertent investment company) 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act issues 
2008 Emergency Economic Stabilization Act issues Dodd-Frank Act, §1502 
Dodd-Frank Act, §1503 Dodd-Frank Act, §1504 
Dodd-Frank Act, Durbin Amendment Dodd-Frank Act, Volcker Rule 
Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (JOBS Act)  
V. Legal Matters and Supreme Court Decisions 
American Airlines, Inc. v. National Meditation Board Basic Inc. v. Levinson 
Board of Trade v. CFTC Braintree Elec. Light Dept v. Department of Energy 
CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan Comstock International (U.S.A.), Inc. v. Bank of U.S. 
Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC Critical Mass Energy Project v. NRC (Critical Mass II) 
Crosby v. National ForeignTrade Council Frazee v. United States Forest Service 
GC Micro Corp. v. Defense Logistics Agency Gilda Indus., Inc. v. U.S. Customs Border Protection Bureau 
Gulf and Western Industries, Inc. v. United States Hanson Trust PLC v. SCM Corp. 
Landfair v. United States Dept of the Army Legal matters/issues (identify, disclose, explain) 
Levy v. Southbrook International Investments, Ltd. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. National Aeronautics & Space  
Nadler v. FDIC National Parks and Conservation Association v. Kleppe  
National Parks and Conservation Association v. Morton Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. SEC 
PETA v. USDA Public Citizen Health Research Group v. FDA 
SEC v. Carter Hawley Hale Stores, Inc. SEC v. Ralston Purina 
SEC v. W.J. Howey Co. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. FTC 
Timken Co. v. US Customs Service Tonopah Mining of Nevada 
TSC Industries, Inc. v. Northway, Inc. Wellman v. Dickinson 
VI. Management Discussion & Analysis  
Business overview issues (MD&A) Capital adequacy and/or calculation issues 





Credit ratings changes Critical Accounting Policies and Estimates (MD&A) 
Executive compensation plan disclosure issues Intellectual Property risk and disclosure issues 
Liquidity issues (MD&A) Loan covenant violations/issues 
Market risk disclosures Oil, Gas and Mining Reserve reporting issues 
Results of Operations (MD&A) US GAAP reconciliation to Foreign GAAP issues 
Valuation of assets, liabilities or equity issues  
VII. Other Disclosure Matters 
Director compensation and options incentive issues Director compensation and options incentives--Benchmark 
issues 
Disclosure Control reporting issues Ethics code issues 
Family/related party transaction disclosure issues Foreign subsidiary--non-accounting disclosure issues 
Future Comment Internal Control (404) Over Financial Reporting Issues 
Materiality - questions about disclosure decisions Non-compliance with prior SEC Staff directive 
Non-GAAP measures (incl. EBIT, EBITDA issues) Outsourcing of accounting and disclosure issues 
Plain English principles - reporting issues Pro-forma financial information reporting issues 
Regulatory asset or liabilities accounting & reporting issues Reorganization and restructuring issues (internal) 
Repetitious statements - reporting issues Restatements made while in bankruptcy/receivership 
Terrorist Nation Sponsor Reporting Issues Third party expert input/consulting/advice issues 
Trade Restrictions - TSRA and OFAC financial disclosure 
issues 
Website issues of registrant/website review by SEC 
VIII. Registration 
Artwork, graphics and photograph issues Background and rationale of offering, disclosure issues 
Board of Directors Oversight Bylaws and articles of incorporation 
Commitment letter missing, needs updating Compensation of advisors to the offering, disclosure issues 
Compensation or benefits of executives from offering, 
disclosure  
Conditions of change in or waiver of the offering 
Conflict of interest disclosure Cost-benefit/undue burden issue in disclosure 
Debt/quasi-debt terms and obligations, disclosure issues Directed, reserved, or employee share purchase issues 
Dividend policy issues Document incorporation issues 
Employment Agreements Environmental protection, health, and safety disclosure issues 
Exchange listing issue Expense of offering, disclosure issues 
Exxon Capital disclosure issues Fairness of offer/fairness opinion issues 
Final prospectus filing issues Financial statements of offerors/bidders/target/subsidiary 
needed 
Form choice/post-effective amendment issues Gun-jumping issues 
Identification of directors and executives Independence of directors 
Internet and/or electronic distribution issues IPO or secondary issuance pricing issues 
Legality opinion issues or requirements Letter justifying S-3 registration filing form 
Lock-Up provisions - securities issuance disclosures Naked short selling issues 
No-action letter disclosure issues Ownership entity (13G and other) disclosure issues 
Partnership disclosure issues--compensation issues. Partnership disclosure issues--structuring issues 
Partnership disclosure issues--tax consequences Personal attacks, attribution of bad motives 
Prospectus summary/ and or cover page -- material detail Prospectus summary--emphasis, balance, clarity issues 
Proxy solicitation (Regulation 14A) disclosure issues Qualitative assertions about markets/results/potential issues 
Quiet period/cooling off period issues Registration exemption issues 
Regulation M disclosure issues Regulatory conditions of the offering, disclosure issues 
Request to accelerate or expedite registration Resale of unregistered, restricted or exempt shares. 
Rescission offer/rescission rights issues Revenue, income from operations (IFO)/results of operations 
Safe harbor invoked but does not apply Selling shareholders- clarify existing short positions 
Selling shareholders--clarify beneficial owners and persons Selling shareholders—clarify broker-dealers and/or underwriters 
Selling shareholders--give terms of private placements Selling shareholders--other disclosure issues 
Share repurchase disclosure issues Signatures/exhibits/agreements 
Substantiate factual claims Supplemental information (sought, provided, returned) 
Tax consequences of the offering, disclosure issues Tax opinion issues or requirements 
Tax receivable agreement. Tax sharing agreement issues 
Technical terms and acronyms--explain and/or define Terms of the offering--explain, clarify, or justify 
Undertakings--provide, revise, or complete Underwriting and underwriter relationships 
Update registration and/or fill in missing information Use of Proceeds - securities/debt issuance issues 
Voting agreements disclosure issues Withdrawal of request to accelerate 
IX. Risk Factors  
Risk Factors - Accounting Policy Change Risk Factors - Anti-takeover issues 
Risk Factors - Barriers to entry Risk Factors - Capital adequacy and liquidity restrictions 
Risk Factors - Change in shareholder rights Risk Factors - Clarify/quantify price volatility risks 
Risk Factors - Climate change matters Risk Factors - Compensation levels and expense 
Risk Factors - Competition and competitors Risk Factors - Conflicts of interest/related party issues 
Risk Factors - Credit restrictions Risk Factors - Credit risk for accounts receivable 
Risk Factors - Data protection and security breaches Risk Factors - Descriptive subheading issues 





Risk Factors - Exchange listing issues Risk Factors - Fluctuations in currency or exchange rates 
Risk Factors - Going concern Risk Factors - Government regulatory effects/changes 
Risk Factors - Inadequate disclosure issues Risk Factors - Ineffective internal or disclosure controls 
Risk Factors - Information about industry Risk Factors - Information technology 
Risk Factors - Intellectual property rights Risk Factors - International operations 
Risk Factors - Investments at risk Risk Factors - Legal exposures, reliance, claims etc. 
Risk Factors - Licensing or regulatory agency approvals Risk Factors - Limited operating history 
Risk Factors - Loss reserves may prove inadequate Risk Factors - Market for offered securities 
Risk Factors - Market for products or services Risk Factors - Merging and acquiring risks 
Risk Factors - Operating losses Risk Factors - Reliance on certain personnel 
Risk Factors - Reliance on suppliers, customers, governments Risk Factors - Remove language downplaying or mitigating risk 
Risk Factors - Remove or specify generic risks Risk Factors - Revenue sources 
Risk Factors - Seasonal fluctuations Risk Factors - Share dilution issues 
Risk Factors - Substantial debt Risk Factors - Tax positions and assumptions 
Risk Factors - Technology reliance, feasibility, etc. Risk Factors - Unbundle discrete risks 
X. Tender Offers 
Accounting treatment of transaction not disclosed Dissemination of offer issues 
Expiration of offer issues Filing persons disclosure (identity, interests) issues 
Funds--disclose source and amount Going-private transaction issues 
Letter of transmittal/election form issues Purpose of transaction unclear/indefinite/not disclosed 








Appendix B. Variable Definitions, Sources and Rationale  
The following variables are constructed using data from Compustat [C], CRSP [CRSP], Audit Analytics 
(Comment Letters, Auditor Changes, Late Filers, Internal Controls, Advanced Restatement Modules) 
[AA], AGR MSCI (Metrics and Scores Modules) [AGR], Thomson Reuters + Bushee Investors’ 
Classification [TR&BUSHEE], IBES [IBES], the SEC’s Edgar database [EDGAR], and a proprietary set 





 percentiles to correct for errors and outliers. 
 
A. Dependent and Experimental Variables 
 
Δ_Bidask Computed as the average bid-ask spread over the (-1,+1) day window around the 
earnings announcement minus the average bid-ask spread over the previous 
quarter. [CRSP]   
Abn_Ret Computed as the market-adjusted return over the (-3,+3) day window around the 
earnings announcement. The abnormal return is the raw return minus the average 
return on the same size-B/M portfolio (six portfolios), as provided by Kenneth R. 
French. [CRSP] 
  
SUE Unexpected EPS divided by price. Unexpected EPS is defined as actual minus 
expected earnings, where the expected value of earnings is calculated as the 
I/B/E/S forecast, which is the median analyst forecast of EPS during the 90-day 
period before the disclosure of earnings. I/B/E/S data (actual and forecast) are 
unadjusted for stock splits. If this information is missing, the expected value of 
earnings is calculated as EPS for the same quarter in the prior year (adjusted for 
stock splits through the current quarter). [C+CRSP+IBES] 
  
SEC Review Dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm received its initial SEC comment letter 
within the past four quarters, and 0 otherwise. [AA+PRIVATE] 
  
Restatements Absolute impact of the restatement in stockholders’ equity over total assets. [AA] 
  
IC Weaknesses Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has disclosed a quarterly 
Section 302 internal control weakness, and 0 otherwise. [AA]   
I.C.W.-Rest. Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has disclosed a quarterly 
Section 302 internal control weakness in which a past restatement is not disclosed 
either directly or indirectly. [AA] 
  
AGR Score The AGR measure provided by MSCI is a percentile ranking scaled from 0 to 
100, and is decreasing in risk (a value of 100 suggests very low risk). It is the 
output from a proprietary model that evaluates public companies’ financial 
reports and independently assesses the risk of misreporting by identifying 
suspicious patterns in accounting. To identify suspicious patterns in accounting, 
Audit Integrity examines the following five areas: (1) expense recognition, (2) 
revenue recognition, (3) high risk events, (4) governance, and (5) asset and 
liability valuation. [AGR] 
 
B. Firm-level Control Variables 
 
Δ_Turnover Average turnover over the (-1,+1) day window around the earnings 
announcement minus the average turnover in the previous quarter. [CRSP] 
  
Past_Bad_News An indicator variable equal to 1 if the overall quarterly abnormal return is 
negative, and 0 otherwise (see Roychowdhury and Slettern [2012]). [CRSP] 
  
Predict Variance (SUE) over the previous 8 quarters (not including the current quarter). 
In Lipe's [1990] model, greater variance of earnings surprises implies less 






Persistence Average time-series persistence for firm i is measured as the autocorrelation 
parameter from Foster's [1977] first-order autoregressive model in seasonally 
differenced earnings (ARl model), estimated using the previous 8 quarters (not 
including the current quarter). [C] 
  
Loss Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if quarterly earnings are negative, and 0 
otherwise. [C] 
  
Nonlinear SUE x |SUE| [C+CRSP+IBES] 
  




Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the earnings announcement is for the 
fourth quarter and 0 otherwise. [C] 
  
Firm_Abs_Return Absolute value of the market-adjusted return over the (-3,+3) day window around 
the announcement. [CRSP] 
  
News_Earnings Absolute value of SUE [C+CRSP+IBES] 
  
Log_Turnover Natural logarithm of the firm’s average turnover, measured over the prior quarter. 
[CRSP] 
  
Log_Volatility Natural logarithm of the return volatility, computed as the standard deviation of 
daily returns over the past quarter. [CRSP] 
  
Log_MV Natural logarithm of the firm’s equity market value (in millions of dollars). 
[CRSP] 
  
Id. Volatility Computed as the standard deviation of the residuals from a market model using 
daily stock returns for the year ending at the close of the prior quarter. [CRSP] 
  
Beta Computed using the market model with daily stock returns over the year ending at 
the close of the prior quarter. [CRSP] 
  
Past_Returns Compounded stock returns over the prior quarter. [CRSP] 
  
Δ_MktBidask Market bid-ask spread over the (-1,+1) day window around the earnings 
announcement minus the average bid-ask spread of the market over the previous 
quarter. [CRSP] 
  
Firm Age Total number of years (through year t) for which a firm appears in CRSP. [CRSP] 
  
ROA Return on assets (earnings before extraordinary items scaled by total assets). [C]  
  
Leverage Total liabilities divided by total assets. [C] 
 
C. Comment Letters Variables 
 
Rounds Number of letters from the SEC, representing the number of rounds from the first 
letter until the “no further comment” letter. [AA+PRIVATE] 
  
Total Comments Total number of unique issues in the SEC’s comment letters that comprise a 
conversation with the SEC, following the taxonomy described in appendix A. 
[AA+PRIVATE] 
  
Exam Length Number of days from the first comment letter issued by the SEC to the “no 




Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the SEC’s comment letter mandates 




Total number of unique issues in the SEC’s comment letters that comprise a 
conversation with the SEC and are included in the taxonomy group ‘Accounting 







Control and Risk 
Comments 
Total number of unique issues in the SEC’s comment letters that comprise a 
conversation with the SEC, and are included in the taxonomy groups ‘Disclosure 
and Internal Controls’, ‘Management Discussion & Analysis’ and ‘Risk Factors’, 
as described in appendix A. [AA+PRIVATE] 
  
Accounting Core  Total number of unique issues in the SEC’s comment letters that comprise a 
conversation with the SEC, and are included in the taxonomy accounting items 
‘Accounts receivable & cash reporting issues’, ‘Depreciation, depletion or 
amortization reporting issues’, ‘Expense (payroll, SGA, other) recording issues’, 
‘Inventory, vendor and/or cost of sales issues’, ‘Lease, leasehold (FAS 13 (98) 
and IAS 17)’, ‘Liabilities, payables, and accrual estimate issues’, ‘Revenue 
recognition (incl. deferred revenue) issues’, ‘Percentage of completion’, 
‘Research and Development issues’, as described in appendix A. This 





Total number of Accounting Comments less the total number of Accounting Non-
core comments. [AA+PRIVATE] 
  




SEC Review Timeliness (High) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one for 
those observations (1) that are reviewed by the SEC, and (2) for which the SEC 
Review Timeliness is above the sample quarter-year median, and is set to 0 
otherwise. SEC Review Timeliness (Low) takes the value of 1 for those firms (1) 
that are reviewed, and (2) for which the SEC disclosure timeliness is below the 
sample quarter-year median, and is set to 0 otherwise. The SEC’s disclosure 
timeliness is the number of days from the firm’s 10K filing to the start of the 
SEC’s firm review, plus the number of days from when the SEC completed its 





Investors’ Monitoring (High/Low) is a dummy variable that takes the value of one 
for those observations (1) that are reviewed by the SEC, and (2) for which the 
percentage of nontransient investors is (above/below) the sample quarter-year 
median, and is set to 0 otherwise.  
Nontransient investors is calculated as institutional holdings categorized as 
‘quasi-indexers’ or ‘dedicated’ in the quarter immediately preceding fiscal year-
end divided by the total shares outstanding as of fiscal year-end, winsorized to 
1.00 (following Cassel et al [2013]). I identify nontransient institutions using data 





SEC Content Predictability (High) takes the value of 1 for firms that (1) are 
reviewed, and (2) have a fiscal year-end between Oct. 1
st
 and Mar. 31
st
, and is set 
to 0 otherwise. SEC Content Predictability (SEC Workload) (Low) takes the value 
of 1 for the firms that are reviewed but do not have a fiscal year-end between the 





Managers’ Disclosure Negotiation (High) takes the value of 1 for those firms that 
(1) are reviewed, and (2) request that some portion of the comment letter be 
redacted because it contains proprietary information, and is set to 0 otherwise.  
Managers’ Disclosure Negotiation (Low) takes the value of 1 for the firms that 
were reviewed but did not request confidential treatment, and is 0 otherwise. 
[AA+PRIVATE] 
  
E. Additional Variables (Probability of SEC Review): 
 
Emerging Firms Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm-year is in the bottom 






Sales Growth Change in annual sales from year t-1 to year t. [C] 
  
Difficult to Price Level of intangible assets scaled by total assets. [C] 
  
Restructuring Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has restructured (to 
increase efficiency) or reorganized (to emerge from Chapter 11 bankruptcy) 
within the previous year, and 0 otherwise. [AGR] 
  
M&A Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has performed an M&A 
corporate transaction during the previous two years, and 0 otherwise. [AGR] 
  
External Financing Sum of equity financing and debt financing scaled by total assets. Equity 
financing equals the sales of common and preferred stock (SSTK) minus the 
value of common and preferred stock purchases (PRSTKC) minus dividends 
(DV). Debt financing equals the change in long-term debt (DLTIS -DLTR) minus 
the change in current debt (DLCCH). [C] 
  
Complexity  Number of non-empty and unique segment industry codes reported in the 
Compustat Segments database. [C] 
  
Late Filers Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if, within the prior year, the company 
has filed form NT in which part 2b=0 (i.e., they will not file in 15 days after due 
date), or Part 2c =1 (i.e., the auditor is involved in the delay) or part 4=1, (i.e., 




Percentage of board members who are insiders, where insiders are defined as the 
corporation’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chairman, Chief 
Administrative Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Investment Officer, 
Chief Operating Officer, Chief Technical Officer, and Chief Scientific Officer. 
[AGR] 
  
Insider Stock Sales  Director, officer, and senior staff insider sales within the previous year. It is 
calculated as the gross number of shares sold in dollars scaled by the market 
capitalization. I define Director, officer, and senior staff as the corporation’s 
Chairman and all Directors of the Board, Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial 
Officer, Chief Administrative Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief 
Investment Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Technical Officer, and Chief 
Scientific Officer, the President, Treasurer, Beneficial Owners and all Vice 
Presidents. [AGR] 
  
Manager Changes Number of changes of managers within the previous year. I define managers as 
the corporation’s Chief Executive Officer, Chief Financial Officer, Chairman, 
Chief Administrative Officer, Chief Accounting Officer, Chief Investment 
Officer, Chief Operating Officer, Chief Technical Officer, and Chief Scientific 
Officer. [AGR] 
  
Big4 Audit A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the company has been audited by a 




A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor resigned within the 
previous year, and 0 otherwise. [AA] 
  
Auditor Dismissal A dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the auditor was dismissed within 
the previous year, and 0 otherwise. [AA] 
  
Lawsuit Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has been the subject of a 
securities class action lawsuit within the previous year, and 0 otherwise. [AGR] 
  
SEC Investigation Dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm has been the target of a SEC 






Figure 1: Identification Strategy 
 
 Figure 1.1 Conceptual Representation of the Research Question: 
    
Figure 1.1 illustrates my main research question: Does the SEC’s disclosure of its firm reviews have 
capital market implications?  The black arrows depict the private regime and the golden arrows depict the 
public regime. Arrow 1 shows that the information about enforcement is now publicly available. Arrow 2 
points out the possibility of a greater complementary enforcement effort carried out by the market, either 
implicitly or explicitly. Arrow 3 illustrates that the enforcement outcome is a trade-off between the 
greater market’s monitoring and the greater managers’ ability to anticipate the content of the SEC 
reviews. The arrow 4 is explained in more detail in the following figure (Figure 1.2). 
Figure 1.2 Predicted Effects of SEC Reviews on Information Asymmetry and Expected Returns 
  
Figure 1.2 illustrates the predicted effects of SEC firm reviews on information asymmetry and 
informativeness around earnings releases. In the Private regime, path A shows that SEC firm reviews may 
increase information asymmetry, because it increases the possibility of informed investors gathering 
private signals. In the public regime, path A shows that SEC firm reviews may increase or decrease 
information asymmetry, depending on whether the information complements or substitutes for the private 
information held by informed investors (Gow, Taylor and Verrecchia [2012]). In the private regime, path 
B shows that the SEC reviews may increase investors’ average precision of information, because 
informed investors may obtain this private signal and less informed investors may partially infer it from 
the informed investors’ trades. In the public regime, path B shows that the SEC reviews may increase 





informed and less informed investors, and also because investors can exert additional pressure to make 
managers increase earnings precision.  For both regimes,  path C shows that an increase in information 
asymmetry may either increase the expected return or keep it at the same level, depending on the 
permanent nature of this information asymmetry change and also  depending on the degree to which 
competition is imperfect, such that the more imperfect is the competition the stronger is the effect (e.g., 
Gow Taylor and Verrecchia [2012], Lambert, Leuz and Verrecchia [2012], Leuz, Armstrong, Core, 
Taylor and Verrecchia  [2011], Akins, Ng, and Verdi [2012]). Finally, for both regimes, paths D and E 
show that an increase in investors’ average precision of information reduces the expected returns, and in 
turn, increases earnings informativeness (SUE). 
 
Figure 1.3 Illustration of the Identification Strategy: 
Figure illustrates the identification strategy. There are two disclosure regimes for SEC enforcement: 
Private and Public. For each firm in each regime, I switch the CL indicator variable (SEC Review) from 
‘0’ to ‘1’ in the four quarters following the SEC’s firm review. Outside of this four-quarter period, the 
indicator is set to‘0’ (unless another review is initiated). Each firm is reviewed at least once every three 
years, and the enforcement dates vary across firms. This variation allows me to introduce fixed effects for 
each firm as well as for every calendar quarter over the sample period. The latter implies that the model 
includes a flexible quarterly time trend. As shown by the different shading of the firm-quarters in Figure 
1.3.  I also exploit cross-sectional differences in the SEC’s implementation of its disclosure policy. 
Figure 1.4 Test I: Disclosure of SEC Enforcement (Standard Diff-in-Diff Analysis): 
 
  SEC Disclosure 
    Public Private 
SEC 
Enforcement 
Yes SECPublic SECPrivate 

















































Figure 1.5 Test II: Heterogeneity in the SEC Disclosure Decision (Triple Diff-in-Diff Analysis): 
 
  SEC Disclosure 
    Public Private 
  Heterogeneity in the SEC Disclosure  
    High Low High Low 
SEC 
Enforcement 
Yes SECPublic x High SECPublic x Low SECPrivate x High SECPrivate x Low 
No BenchmarkPublic BenchmarkPrivate 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of the Partitioning Variables Pattern 
Figure 2.1: Timeliness of the SEC’s Disclosure of its Firm Reviews (Days):
 
Figure 2.1 illustrates the SEC’s average timeliness of disclosure, where the average timeliness is 
calculated as the average number of days from the firm’s 10K filing to the start of the SEC’s firm review 
(time-to-start review), plus the number of days from when the SEC completed its review to when the 



















Figure 2.2: Analysis of the SEC’s Within-Year Workload: 
 Figure 2.2 illustrates the SEC’s average workload within a year. The cyclical nature of the Division’s 
workload is due to the volume of firms with December fiscal year-end.  This figure shows that this 
workload peak does not affect the intensity of the review (i.e. the number of comments). I plot the 
percentage of 10K filings reviewed by month (for the private and public SEC disclosure regimes), the 
time-to-start review, which is defined as the number of days between the firm’s 10K filing and the start of 
the SEC’s firm review, and the firm’s average number of comments in a comment letter.  In the following 




Figure 2.3: Comment Letters’ Content Persistence: Partitioned by the SEC’s Workload  
Figure 2.3 plots the pattern of the persistence of the comment letters’ content across two groups: High and 
Low SEC workload (firms are defined as High if they have fiscal-year ends ranging from October 1st to 
March 31st, and Low otherwise). The goal is to illustrate whether making comment letters publicly 
available helps managers to anticipate the content of the SEC’s firm reviews, and whether the ability to 
anticipate the content of the letters varies across the two groups. To analyze the comment letters’ 
persistence, I perform the following steps. First, I map the comment letters’ content using 273 
independent groups (see appendix A). Second, I parse the first comment letters sent to each firm and I 
create a vector of the same length (273 bits) across firms. I mark each group as 1 if that group appears in 
the content of the comment letters at least once, and the variable is otherwise set to 0, effectively creating 





vectors with respect to the same vectors in the previous year (there are 11 SEC industry groups). That is, I 
measure the degree of overlap of the industry-workload mean content vectors over time. The cosine 
content similarity is a measure of similarity between two vectors of an inner product space that measures 
the cosine of the angle between them, i.e. cosφ=V1.V2/||V1||*||V2||. Unlike the cosine in Euclidean inner 
product space, this statistic is bounded below at 0, and above at 1.  A score of 1 means that the content 
vectors of the review letters are either identical or their values differ by a constant factor. A score of 0 
means that the content vectors of the review letters do not share any content. 
 
 
Figure 2.4: Within-Industry Comment Letters’ Content Predictability
 
Figure 2.4 plots the pattern of the comment letters’ content using two metrics across two groups: High 
and Low SEC workload (firms are defined as High if they have a fiscal-year end ranging from October 1st 
to March 31st, and Low otherwise). The goal is to illustrate whether making comment letters publicly 
available helps managers to anticipate the content of the SEC’s firm reviews, and whether the ability to 
anticipate content of the letter varies across the two groups. To this end, I analyze the SEC’s lack of 
synchronization in sending the first review letter to firms in the same industry-workload-year group 
(Within-Industry Staggered Time-To-Start Review), and the dissimilarity of the first review letters sent to 
firms within the same industry-workload-year group (Within-Industry Comments Dissimilarity). If the 
SEC staggers the firm reviews within a year, and the comment letters are not dissimilar across firms 
within the same industry, some firms that will be reviewed later in the year can look at comment letters 
that were issued earlier in the year. Within-Industry Staggered Time-To-Start Review is the average 
number of days from the start date of the SEC’s firm review and their workload-industry median date. To 
analyze the comment letters’ similarity, I perform the following steps. First, I map the comment letters’ 
content using 273 independent groups (see appendix A). Second, I parse the first comment letters sent to 
each firm and I create a vector of the same length (273 bits) across firms. I mark each group as 1 if that 
group appears in the content of the comment letters at least once, and the variable is otherwise set to 0, 
effectively creating content vectors. Within-Industry Comments Dissimilarity is the square root of the sum 
of standard deviations for each bit of the content vectors of all firms within the same workload-industry-






Figure 3: Ruling-Out Alternative Explanations: Changes in the SEC’s 
Enforcement Intensity across the Disclosure Regimes 
 
Figure 3 illustrates the plausibility of the alternative explanation that the SEC’s disclosure shock is 
confounded by a concurrent increase in the SEC’s enforcement intensity due to the SEC’s budget 
increases. I try to rule out this alternative explanation by showing the relation between the SEC Division 
of Corporation Finance’s budget (left axis) and the number of firms reviewed (right axis), a relation that 
has a correlation of 0.84; and the relation of the SEC Division of Corporation Finance’s budget and the 
intensity of the SEC’s review (right axis), a relation that has null correlation. The intensity of the SEC’s 
review is proxied by the average number of comments and conversation rounds for each firm. Overall, 
this graph provides evidence that the number of firms treated has increased, but the intensity of the 
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Figure 4: Receiver Operating Characteristic (ROC) Curves for Models in Table 9 
 
Model1: All Sample-Private    Model 2: Subsample-Private 
 
 
Model 3: All Sample-Public    Model 4: Subsample-Public 
 
Figure 4 illustrates the goodness of fit of the logit models in Table 9.The ROC curve plots the probability 
of detecting a true signal (sensitivity) and a false signal (1 – specificity) for the entire range of possible 
cut-off points (Kim and Skinner [2012]). The area under the ROC curve, which ranges from 0 to 1, 
provides a measure of the model’s ability to discriminate. A value of 0.5 indicates no ability to 
discriminate (might as well toss a coin) while a value of 1 indicates perfect ability to discriminate. Thus, 
the greater the area, the better the global performance of the model. An area under the ROC curve of 0.5 
indicates no discrimination, an area under the ROC curve between 0.7 and 0.8 indicates acceptable 
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Table 1. Sample Selection (2002-2013)  
 
 
Total Observations Available in Compustat Annual Database for 2002-2013   132,978 
Less – Firm-years that are limited partnerships, holding firms, ADRs, etc. (12,241)   
Less – Firm-years that are private or listed in OTCBB and/or pink sheets (no info in CRSP) (48,337)   
Less – Firm-years that are shell firms or <1-year-old (missing 10-K filing from the SEC Edgar Database) (17,055)   
Less – Firm-years that are foreign private issuers  filing either 20-F and 40-F forms (6,396)   
Less – Firm-years from which I do not have comment letters in the private regime (2002- 2005) (14,359)   
Less – Firm-years of companies that are not reviewed in a 3-year cycle in the public regime, (after 2005) (9,844)   
Total Firm-Year Observations Available for 2002-2013   24,746 
Benchmark sample:      
Private (Before 2005)   1,905 
Publicly Available (after 2005)   11,008 
SEC firm reviews sample:      
Private (Before 2005) (3,263 letters)   808 
Publicly Available (after 2005) (53,851 letters)   11,025 
Total Firm-Quarter Sample Available for all Regressions   77,057 
Private (Before 2005)   8,442 










Table 2. Descriptive Statistics 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the data used to analyze the effects of the SEC disclosure 
policy. Panel A reports descriptive statistics of firm characteristics for all firm-quarters from fiscal year 
2002 through fiscal year 2013. Panel B contains firm characteristics of firm-quarters reviewed by the 
SEC, and the data are partitioned into columns based on whether the observation is High (see the 
definitions for each partitioning variable in Appendix B) or Low (all other observations). Those 
observations after 2005, when the SEC made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and 
the rest are considered Private. Figures in bold indicate that the difference in means is significant at 0.05. 
All variables are defined as in Appendix B. 
 
Panel A. Characteristics of All Sample Firms 
 
  PRIVATE                                               
(8,442 firm-quarters) 
  PUBLIC                                               
(68,615 firm-quarters)     
Variables Mean Median Std.   Mean Median Std. 
SEC Review 0.30 0.00 0.46   0.53 1.00 0.50 
Δ_Bidask 0.001 -0.009 0.733   0.042 0.002 0.674 
Abn_Ret -0.03 -0.06 8.66   -0.04 -0.09 8.95 
SUE 0.005 0.001 0.079   -0.001 0.001 0.090 
Restatements 0.04 0.00 0.76   0.02 0.00 0.62 
I.C. Weaknesses 0.05 0.00 0.22   0.04 0.00 0.20 
I.C.W.-Restatements 0.03 0.00 0.17   0.03 0.00 0.16 
AGR Score 41.14 38.00 27.37   38.79 35.00 26.24 
Δ_MktBidask -0.025 -0.022 0.105   -0.008 -0.019 0.163 
Δ_Turnover 0.005 0.001 0.012   0.007 0.003 0.013 
News_Earnings 0.02 0.00 0.08   0.02 0.00 0.09 
Log_Turnover 0.01 0.00 0.01   0.01 0.01 0.01 
Log_MV 5.56 5.09 2.12   6.64 6.61 1.93 
Log_Volatility 0.03 0.02 0.02   0.02 0.02 0.02 
Firm_Abs_Return 0.01 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 0.01 
BM 0.61 0.48 0.60   0.68 0.52 0.77 
Log_Price 2.30 2.42 1.14   2.71 2.90 1.15 
Firm Age 16.09 10.75 15.48   20.58 15.50 16.77 
ROA -0.01 0.00 0.06   0.00 0.01 0.06 
Leverage 0.53 0.52 0.28   0.55 0.54 0.26 
Past Returns 1.70 -0.20 18.75   0.72 -0.32 17.72 
Loss 0.34 0.00 0.47   0.27 0.00 0.45 
Id. Volatility 0.03 0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02 0.02 
Predict 0.01 0.00 0.04   0.01 0.00 0.05 
Persistence 0.09 0.06 0.39   0.14 0.10 0.65 
Q4 0.26 0.00 0.44   0.25 0.00 0.43 
NonLinear 0.00 0.00 0.09   0.00 0.00 0.15 
Past Bad News 0.51 1.00 0.50   0.51 1.00 0.50 





Panel B. Characteristics of Firms Reviewed by the SEC 
 















Variables Low High   Low High   Low High   Low High 
Δ_Bidask 0.044 0.032   0.053 0.023   0.037 0.038   0.053 0.023 
Abn_Ret -0.14 -0.01   -0.37 0.21   0.15 -0.12   -0.37 0.21 
SUE -0.002 -0.002   -0.003 -0.001   -0.004 -0.002   -0.003 -0.001 
Restatements 0.03 0.03   0.04 0.02   0.05 0.03   0.04 0.02 
IC Weaknesses 0.04 0.05   0.06 0.03   0.08 0.04   0.06 0.03 
ICW-Restatements 0.03 0.03   0.04 0.02   0.05 0.03   0.04 0.02 
AGR Score 39.40 35.35   41.08 33.74   37.42 37.37   41.08 33.74 
Δ_MktBidask -0.008 -0.011   -0.007 -0.012   -0.019 -0.008   -0.007 -0.012 
Δ_Turnover 0.007 0.007   0.005 0.009   0.008 0.007   0.005 0.009 
News_Earnings 0.02 0.02   0.03 0.01   0.03 0.02   0.03 0.01 
Log_Turnover 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 
Log_MV 6.49 7.21   5.98 7.73   6.33 6.95   5.98 7.73 
Log_Volatility 0.02 0.02   0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02 
Firm_Abs_Return 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 
BM 0.67 0.64   0.74 0.57   0.67 0.65   0.74 0.57 
Log_Price 2.64 2.92   2.30 3.26   2.54 2.83   2.30 3.26 
Firm Age 20.08 22.36   18.84 23.60   21.82 21.11   18.84 23.60 
ROA 0.00 0.00   -0.01 0.01   0.00 0.00   -0.01 0.01 
Leverage 0.55 0.55   0.56 0.54   0.48 0.56   0.56 0.54 
Past Returns 0.67 0.78   0.76 0.67   0.47 0.77   0.76 0.67 
Loss 0.28 0.24   0.35 0.18   0.28 0.26   0.35 0.18 
Id. Volatility 0.03 0.02   0.03 0.02   0.03 0.03   0.03 0.02 
Predict 0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01   0.01 0.01 
Persistence 0.14 0.13   0.12 0.15   0.15 0.13   0.12 0.15 
Q4 0.25 0.25   0.25 0.25   0.26 0.25   0.25 0.25 
NonLinear 0.00 0.00   0.00 -0.01   -0.01 0.00   0.00 -0.01 
Past Bad News 0.51 0.50   0.52 0.49   0.52 0.50   0.52 0.49 
Beta 1.10 1.11   1.02 1.19   1.01 1.12   1.02 1.19 











Table 3. The Effect of SEC’s Disclosure of Firm Reviews on Bid-Ask Spreads Changes Around Earnings Announcements 
 
This table reports the results of estimating the effect of the SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews on the bid-ask spread changes around earnings announcements. Those 
observations after 2005, when the SEC made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and the rest are considered Private.  SEC Review is a dummy variable 
that is set to 1 if the firm received its initial SEC comment letter within the past four quarters, and 0 otherwise. . All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Standard errors 




Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review 0.053*** 3.21 0.056*** 3.70 0.050*** 3.37 -0.001 -0.65 -0.003 -1.26 -0.002 -0.72
Δ_MktBidask 0.664*** 6.07 0.656*** 5.88 0.667*** 6.13 0.291*** 10.22 0.279*** 10.34 0.290*** 10.31
Δ_Turnover -3.553*** -6.22 -4.453*** -5.33 -3.638*** -6.86 -0.972*** -6.42 -0.955*** -6.69 -0.990*** -6.65
News_Earnings -0.017 -0.07 0.129 0.60 -0.002 -0.01 0.001 0.03 -0.009 -0.23 0.002 0.06
Log_Turnover 7.223*** 6.75 5.884*** 3.16 6.952*** 6.48 1.426** 2.35 1.881** 2.31 1.397** 2.25
Log_MV -0.003 -0.60 0.029 0.55 -0.006 -0.96 -0.008*** -3.76 -0.012 -1.39 -0.008*** -3.84
Log_Volatility -5.750*** -9.35 -7.018*** -8.16 -5.926*** -9.54 -1.896*** -3.90 -2.415*** -4.58 -1.907*** -3.89
Firm_Abs_Return 0.084 0.17 -0.560 -1.03 -0.067 -0.13 1.266*** 5.57 1.012*** 4.00 1.251*** 5.50
BM -0.032** -2.08 0.013 0.68 -0.028* -1.88 -0.004 -1.12 -0.001 -0.21 -0.004 -0.93
Log_Price -0.021* -1.68 0.046 0.87 -0.012 -0.95 0.005** 2.16 0.010 0.98 0.005** 2.25
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):








No No Yes No No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
66,585
No Yes No No Yes No
8,167 8,167 8,167 66,585 66,585
Yes
Dependent Variable: Δ_Bidask
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
PRIVATE PUBLIC










Table 4. The Effect of SEC’s Disclosure of Firm Reviews on Earnings Informativeness Around Earnings Announcements 
 
This table provides evidence of the effect of the SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews on earnings informativeness around earnings announcements. Those observations after 
2005, when the SEC made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and the rest are considered Private.  SEC Review is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the 
firm received its initial SEC comment letter within the past four quarters, and 0 otherwise. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Standard errors are double clustered by 
firm and quarter-year.*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively.  
 
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review 0.25 0.72 0.14 0.37 0.23 0.62 -0.03 -0.44 -0.10 -1.26 -0.04 -0.53
SUE 38.90*** 4.04 29.41*** 3.05 38.73*** 4.02 13.60*** 3.39 11.97*** 2.73 13.53*** 3.39
SUE x SEC Review -7.11 -1.05 -6.92 -0.98 -6.88 -1.03 6.01*** 4.44 5.88*** 3.94 5.96*** 4.48
Predict -1.13 -0.26 8.12 1.41 -0.69 -0.16 1.04 0.67 1.82 0.84 1.20 0.77
Persistence 0.29 0.96 0.43 1.11 0.32 1.04 0.35*** 5.64 0.35*** 3.91 0.35*** 5.66
Loss -2.38*** -8.21 -3.24*** -6.40 -2.41*** -7.65 -2.85*** -19.09 -2.93*** -18.26 -2.90*** -19.79
NonLinear -19.31*** -3.35 -13.89** -1.97 -19.16*** -3.27 -15.90*** -5.99 -14.69*** -6.53 -15.82*** -5.92
Log_MV 0.02 0.36 -4.35*** -6.43 0.04 0.61 -0.05* -1.82 -3.06*** -13.31 -0.05* -1.92
BM 1.41*** 4.71 1.14** 2.30 1.41*** 4.59 0.68*** 6.99 0.49*** 2.65 0.75*** 7.03
Past Bad News 0.31 1.42 0.34* 1.69 0.30 1.47 -0.06 -0.50 0.09 0.73 -0.04 -0.37
Beta -0.18 -0.52 -0.21 -0.73 -0.24 -0.68 0.29* 1.73 0.05 0.20 0.30* 1.92
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
SUE x SECReview Public = SUE xSECReview private
Adj R
2






Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
4.9%
59,710
No No Yes No No Yes
7,536 7,536 7,536 59,710 59,710
No
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No Yes No No Yes
Dependent Variable: Abn_Ret
4.2% 8.4% 4.2% 4.9% 7.8%
PRIVATE PUBLIC







Table 5. Heterogeneity in the Effects of SEC Disclosure 
 
This table presents evidence on cross-sectional variation in the capital-market effects of the SEC’s 
disclosure of firm reviews. Panel A (C) reports the results of estimating cross-sectional variation in the 
relationship between SEC disclosure timeliness (the extent of investors’ monitoring) and information 
asymmetry (earnings informativeness) around earnings announcements.  Panel B (D) reports finer 
partitions of the cross-sectional variation effects of SEC reviews’ disclosure timeliness (investors’ 
monitoring) on information asymmetry (earnings informativeness). Those observations after 2005, when 
the SEC made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and the rest are considered Private. 
SEC Review is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm received its initial SEC comment letter within 
the past four quarters, and 0 otherwise. SEC Review Timeliness High (Low) is a dummy variable that 
takes the value of one for those observations (1) that are reviewed by the SEC, and (2) for which the SEC 
Review Timeliness is above (below) the sample quarter-year median, and is set to 0 otherwise. The SEC’s 
disclosure timeliness is the number of days from the firm’s 10K filing to the start of the SEC’s firm 
review, plus the number of days from when the SEC completed its review to when the review was 
disclosed to the public.  Investors’ Monitoring (High/Low) is a dummy variable that takes the value of 
one for those observations (1) that are reviewed by the SEC, and (2) for which the percentage of 
nontransient investors is (above/below) the sample quarter-year median, and is set to 0 otherwise. Q1 to 
Q4 are dummy variables that take the value of one for those observations that are reviewed by the SEC 
and for which the partitioning variable is within the sample quarter-year respective quartiles, and 0 
otherwise.  All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Standard errors are double clustered by firm and 
quarter-year. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tail) levels, 
respectively. 
 




Panel B. Information Asymmetry: Cross-Sectional Variation Across Quartiles 
 
Dependent Variable: Δ_Bidask 
    SEC Reviews’ Timeliness (Quartiles) 
Indep. Variables   Low Q2 Q3 High   High-Low 
PRIVATE:               
SEC Review   0.054*** 0.043 0.043* 0.061***   0.007 
PUBLIC:               
SEC Review   0.003 0.001 -0.004* -0.006*   -0.009* 
Firm-level Control Variables   Yes     
Quarter-Year Effects   Yes     
Office Effects   Yes     
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review High 0.052*** 3.78 -0.005** -2.22
SEC Review Low 0.049** 2.40 0.002 0.69
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
High=Low
High Public =High Private
Low Public =Low Private
Triple Diff-in-Diff (F-test for diff):






























Panel D. Earnings Informativeness: Cross-Sectional Variation Across Quartiles 
 
Dependent Variable: Abn_Ret 
    Investors’ Monitoring (Quartiles) 
Indep. Variables   Low Q2 Q3 High   High-Low 
PRIVATE:               
SEC Review   21.67* -22.08*** -11.53* -1.80   -23.47** 
PUBLIC:               
SEC Review   0.83 8.58** 8.03*** 5.16***   4.33 
Firm-level Control Variables   Yes     
Quarter-Year Effects   Yes     
Office Effects   Yes     
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review High 0.34 1.23 0.09 0.71
SEC Review Low 0.12 0.26 -0.17** -2.00
SUE 38.33*** 3.86 13.24*** 3.41
SUE x SEC Review High -11.00 -1.20 4.39 1.42
SUE x SEC Review Low -5.67 -0.81 6.16*** 5.08
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
High=Low
High Public =High Private
Low Public =Low Private
Triple Diff-in-Diff (F-test for diff):


























Table 6. SEC’s Disclosure of Firm Reviews and Enforcement Efficacy 
 
This table presents evidence on cross-sectional variation in the relationship between firms’ potential to 
mitigate enforcement efficacy and the capital-market effects of the SEC’s disclosure of firm reviews. 
Panel A (B) reports the results of estimating cross-sectional variation in the relationship between 
managers’ ability to anticipate the content of the reviews or negotiate its dissemination and information 
asymmetry (earnings informativeness) around earnings releases. Those observations after 2005, when the 
SEC made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and the rest are considered Private. 
SEC Review is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm received its initial SEC comment letter within 
the past four quarters, and 0 otherwise. SEC Reviews’ Content Predictability (SEC Workload) (High) 





, and is set to 0 otherwise. SEC Reviews’ Content Predictability (SEC Workload) (Low) takes the 
value of 1 for the firms that are reviewed but do not have a fiscal year-end between the aforementioned 
dates, and is set to 0 otherwise. Managers’ Disclosure Negotiation (High) takes the value of 1 for those 
firms that (1) are reviewed, and (2) request that some portion of the comment letter be redacted because it 
contains proprietary information, and is set to 0 otherwise.  Managers’ Disclosure Negotiation (Low) 
takes the value of 1 for the firms that were reviewed but did not request confidential treatment, and is 0 
otherwise. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Standard errors are double clustered by firm and 
quarter-year.*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tail) levels, 
respectively.  
 
Panel A. Information Asymmetry: Cross-Sectional Variation in Enforcement Efficacy 
 
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review High 0.047*** 2.86 -0.003 -1.16 0.031* 1.95 0 -0.003 -0.86
SEC Review Low 0.071** 2.08 0.004 0.68 0.054*** 3.22 0 -0.001 -0.58
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
High=Low
High Public =High Private
Low Public =Low Private
Triple Diff-in-Diff (F-test for diff):








8,167 66,585 8,167 66,585
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes




0.011 0.77 0.012 0.57
0.53 0.28 0.27 0.51
Dependent Variable: Δ_Bidask
SEC Reviews' Content 
Predictability
Managers  ́Disclosure 
Negotiation





Panel B. Earnings Informativeness: Cross-Sectional Variation in Enforcement Efficacy 
 
  
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review High 0.29 0.73 -0.07 -0.99 0.27 0.40 0 -0.00 -0.02
SEC Review Low -0.17 -0.37 0.11 0.66 0.22 0.62 0 -0.05 -0.57
SUE 39.10*** 4.09 13.43*** 3.36 38.71*** 4.01 013.50*** 3.42
SUE x SEC Review High -2.80 -0.46 5.50*** 4.47 -22.61 -1.43 0 6.89* 1.86
SUE x SEC Review Low -18.47 -1.37 7.19** 2.41 -5.08 -0.81 0 5.83*** 3.66
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
High=Low
High Public =High Private
Low Public =Low Private
Triple Diff-in-Diff (F-test for diff):









Coef. p-value Coef. p-value
-16.54
0.07
7,536 59,710 7,536 59,710
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes
4.2% 4.9% 4.2% 4.9%
0.05
0.04 0.02
0.20 0.57 0.23 0.81
Dependent Variable: Abn_Ret
SEC Reviews' Content 
Predictability
Managers  ́Disclosure 
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Table 7. Alternative Explanation: Increase in the SEC’s Oversight Intensity 
This table presents the results for the test addressing the possibility that my results are driven by an increase in SEC oversight intensity in the public period. Panel A reports 
the main outputs of the comment letters before and after the SEC’s change in disclosure. Panel B provides evidence from an OLS regression on the main effects of the SEC 
firm reviews on firm’s misstatements. Those observations after 2005, when the SEC made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and the rest are considered 
Private. SEC Review is a dummy variable that is set to 1 if the firm received its initial SEC comment letter within the past four quarters, and 0 otherwise. All variables are 




Panel A. SEC Oversight Intensity: Comment Letters’ Output 
    PRIVATE   PUBLIC   Differences (Public-Private) 
Variable   Mean Median   Mean Median   Mean Median 
Total Comments   11.05 8.00   8.22 7.00   -2.82*** -1.00*** 
Accounting Comments:   6.02 5.00   3.87 3.00   -2.15*** -2.00*** 
      Accounting Core Comments   1.83 1.00   0.91 0.00   -0.92*** -1.00*** 
     Accounting Non-Core Comments   4.18 3.00   2.95 2.00   -1.23*** -1.00*** 
Operational, Control and Risk Comments   2.47 2.00   2.34 2.00     -0.13             0.00 
SEC-driven Restatements   0.05 0.00   0.01 0.00   -0.04*** -0.00*** 
Rounds   4.61 4.00   4.88 4.00   0.27***            -0.00** 




















Panel B. SEC Oversight Intensity: Misstatements 
 
Dep. Variables
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review 0.027 1.35 0.021** 2.22 0.012* 1.79 -2.639* -1.95 0.013** 2.45 0.004** 2.28 0.003** 2.06 -0.791*** -2.88
Firm Age -0.000 -0.82 0.001 1.54 0.000 0.41 0.032 0.63 -0.000 -0.54 0.000 0.19 0.000 1.26 -0.044** -2.10
ROA -0.237 -1.03 0.069 0.89 0.039 0.65 23.355** 2.24 -0.331** -2.48 -0.021 -0.59 -0.012 -0.36 37.213*** 8.17
Leverage 0.101** 2.02 0.030 1.63 0.012 0.90 -4.122 -1.29 -0.010 -0.74 0.014* 1.83 0.004 0.65 -3.494*** -2.77
Log_MV -0.009 -0.97 -0.005** -2.22 -0.003** -2.05 -6.525*** -14.97 -0.004*** -2.78 -0.007*** -5.72 -0.006*** -5.64 -5.130*** -24.89
BM -0.034 -1.26 -0.004 -0.91 -0.001 -0.43 -4.509*** -3.76 -0.014*** -3.61 -0.001 -0.30 -0.001 -0.34 -3.115*** -6.26
Past Returns -0.001 -0.60 -0.000 -0.83 0.000 0.14 0.021 1.01 -0.000** -2.34 -0.000*** -4.44 -0.000*** -4.66 0.031*** 2.76
Loss 0.005 0.25 0.026** 2.30 0.018** 1.98 -7.662*** -5.85 0.001 0.11 0.015*** 3.30 0.009*** 2.66 -4.623*** -8.18
Id. Volatility 0.126 0.17 0.093 0.40 -0.157 -0.78 -281.629*** -6.06 0.676** 2.06 1.059*** 5.80 0.922*** 5.96 -226.198*** -10.18
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
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Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes YesYes
8,442 8,442 8,442 68,615 68,615
YesYes
0.5% 6.5% 4.6% 0.4% 3.3% 13.8%21.3%





Table 8. Additional Evidence: Market Reaction around Comment Letter 
Dissemination Dates 
 
This table reports the results of estimating the stock market reaction around the dissemination of comment 
letters. Panel A provides evidence of the effect of SEC’s firm reviews on the bid-ask spread changes around 
comment letter dissemination dates. Panel B provides evidence of the effect of SEC’s firm reviews on the 
stock returns around comment letter dissemination dates. Those observations after 2005, when the SEC 
made firm reviews publicly available, are considered Public, and the rest are considered Private. The 
dependent variable Δ_Bidask is the bid-ask spread over the (-1,+1) day window around the comment letter 
dissemination date (in the public period) or the last comment letter date (in the private period), with the firm-
level control variables used in Table 3. The dependent variable Abn_Ret is the daily risk-adjusted stock 
return over the (-1,+1) day window around the comment letter dissemination date (in the public period) or 
the last comment letter date (in the private period). Returns are adjusted for risk using the Fama-French 
three-factor model, and expressed as a percentage. SEC Review Dissemination is the intercept of the 
regression. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. Standard errors are double clustered by firm and 




Panel A.  Bid-Ask Spreads around Comment Letter Dissemination Dates 
Dependent Variable: Δ_Bidask 
    PRIVATE   PUBLIC 
Indep. Variables   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat 
SEC Review Dissemination   -0.060 -0.53   -0.111*** -3.58 
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):       
SECReviewPublic=SECReviewPrivate         0.09 
Adj R
2
   3.3%   4.0% 
Firm-level Control Variables   Yes   Yes 
N   733   10,349 
 
 
Panel B.  Market Reaction around Comment Letter Dissemination Dates 
Dependent Variable: Abn_Ret 
    PRIVATE   PUBLIC 
Indep. Variables   Coef. t-stat   Coef. t-stat 
SEC Review Dissemination   -0.017 -0.29   -0.046*** -3.41 
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):       
SECReviewPublic=SECReviewPrivate         0.64 
Adj R
2
   0.0%   0.1% 







Table 9. Determinants of Receiving an SEC Review 
 
This table presents evidence on the determinants of receiving an SEC review and on the cross-sectional 
variation in the capital-market effects of SEC disclosure once I control for those determinants. In Panel A, I 
look at the determinants of the firm’s probability of receiving a SEC review, using the whole sample, and a 
subsample in which I remove those firms that are reviewed more than once in a three-year cycle. I estimate 
the first four models using logistic regression, and the last two models using OLS regression. For parsimony, 
I report the interaction effects. In Panel B (C), I report the results of estimating OLS cross-sectional variation 
in the relationship between SEC disclosure timeliness (the extent of investors’ monitoring) and information 
asymmetry (earnings informativeness) around earnings announcements, after removing those firms reviewed 
more than once in a three-year cycle and adding all the determinants of receiving an SEC Review included 
in model 6 of panel A. Those observations after 2005, when the SEC made firm reviews publicly available, 
are considered Public, and the rest are considered Private. All variables are defined as in Appendix B. 
Standard errors are clustered by year in panel A, and double clustered by division and quarter-year in Panel 
B. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% (two-tail) levels, respectively. 
 
Panel A. Determinants of Receiving an SEC Review  
   
(5) (6)
All Sample Subsample
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef. Coef.
Intercept 1.403 0.60 2.253 1.20 -1.777*** -4.00 -0.961** -2.07 -0.543 -0.461
Section 408 Criteria:
Emerging Firms 0.504 1.56 0.584* 1.69 0.083 0.78 0.112 0.93 -0.068 -0.071
Size -0.184 -1.05 -0.320*** -3.62 0.235*** 5.17 0.048 1.17 0.081** 0.055*
Id. Volatility -29.615** -2.30 -38.284*** -3.23 8.225*** 2.82 7.189* 1.87 5.684* 6.294*
IC Weaknesses 2.250*** 4.45 2.285*** 4.32 0.099* 1.73 0.114* 1.78 -0.412*** -0.406***
Restatements -0.225 -1.46 -0.157 -1.26 -0.072 -1.50 -0.081 -1.56 0.020 0.007
Other Company Characteristics:
Loss -0.208** -2.05 -0.194** -1.96 -0.041 -0.98 -0.146** -2.39 0.024 -0.001
Leverage -0.011 -0.06 -0.049 -0.26 0.146 1.52 0.050 0.48 0.028 0.010
ROA 0.593* 1.86 0.724*** 3.12 0.082 0.81 0.143 1.33 -0.064 -0.054
Sales Growth 0.374*** 4.10 0.419*** 6.46 0.082 1.42 0.089 1.45 -0.044 -0.046
Difficult to Price 0.858* 1.78 1.062* 1.94 -0.062 -0.51 0.027 0.26 -0.156 -0.159
Restructuring -0.401 -1.58 -0.706*** -4.04 0.011 0.12 0.030 0.36 0.074 0.111*
M&A -0.170* -1.82 -0.224*** -2.76 0.033 1.25 -0.024 -0.51 0.036* 0.030
External Financing 0.680*** 5.81 0.544*** 2.86 0.155 1.12 0.147 0.94 -0.074 -0.052
Complexity 0.114 1.63 0.052 1.12 -0.015 -0.51 -0.014 -0.40 -0.020 -0.006
Late Filer -0.081 -0.63 -0.035 -0.30 0.008 0.15 -0.021 -0.30 0.015 0.001
BM -0.725*** -3.63 -0.740*** -3.57 0.041 1.07 -0.028 -0.69 0.097* 0.080
Past Returns -0.005 -1.34 -0.005 -1.10 -0.001** -1.98 -0.001 -1.52 0.000 0.000
Beta 0.935*** 4.03 1.176*** 7.01 -0.067 -1.15 -0.010 -0.15 -0.167** -0.180***
Monitor Characteristics:
Board Dependent % -0.969 -1.17 -1.262* -1.79 0.419 1.46 0.187 0.64 0.271 0.253
Insiders Stock Sales 0.021 0.00 1.442 0.36 0.421 0.32 0.768 0.62 0.122 0.003
Manager Changes -0.053 -1.25 -0.045 -1.06 0.019 1.03 0.048* 1.84 0.016* 0.021**
Big 4 Audit -0.620*** -11.21 -0.587*** -9.63 -0.027 -0.59 0.043 0.74 0.107** 0.113**
Auditor Resignation 0.097 0.21 0.191 0.42 -0.052 -0.71 -0.068 -0.62 -0.040 -0.065
Auditor Dismissal -0.176 -0.88 -0.143 -0.89 0.037 0.42 0.060 0.88 0.040 0.041
Lawsuit -0.032 -0.18 -0.031 -0.10 -0.003 -0.04 -0.131 -1.13 0.006 -0.027
SEC Investigation 1.610*** 3.87 1.479** 2.57 0.239 1.48 0.488** 2.24 -0.262** -0.114
Pseudo- R
2 6.2% 3.8%
N 24,462 16,7172,674 2,561 21,788 14,156
15.8% 18.8% 2.5% 0.5%
Subsample
Dependent variable: SEC Review
Diff Public-Private 
All Sample Subsample All Sample
Private Public










Panel C. Earnings Informativeness: Subsample and Adding Additional Controls  
 
Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review High 0.029*** 4.63 -0.005* -1.76
SEC Review Low 0.038* 1.86 0.006 1.50
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
High=Low
High Public =High Private
Low Public =Low Private
Triple Diff-in-Diff (F-test for diff):























Indep. Variables Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat
SEC Review High 0.06 0.14 -0.12 -0.71
SEC Review Low -0.24 -0.43 -0.20* -1.85
SUE 42.59*** 3.03 10.43 1.38
SUE x SEC Review High -19.78*** -3.40 5.36* 1.70
SUE x SEC Review Low -5.05 -0.70 6.91** 2.02
F-test for Differences across Coefficients (p-value):
High=Low
High Public =High Private
Low Public =Low Private
Triple Diff-in-Diff (F-test for diff):




Firm-level Control Variables x SUE
All Additional Prob. SEC Review Controls














Investors  ́Monitoring 
PRIVATE PUBLIC
0.04 0.75
0.00
